zz - Scenarios Flashcards by Fred Francis (2024)

1

Q

You are taxiing out. ATC advises the need of a pivot turn (180-turn) on the RWY due to TWY closure.
What are your thoughts?

(DoD 2)

A

Not allowed in case of:

  • Contaminated RWYs
  • BWS faulty

Considerations:

  • Apply correction for TOPA (i.e. select next intersection for TKOF)

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2

Q

On Final APP, ATC advises the need of a pivot turn (180-turn) at the end of the RWY due to TWY closure.
What are your thoughts?

(DoD 2)

A

Not allowed in case of:

  • Contaminated RWYs
  • BWS faulty

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3

Q

Just BFR pushback, ACFT is dispatched we APU BL INOP.
What are your thoughts?

(DoD 2)

A

  • Anticipate request of GND pneumatic PWR.
  • Advice ATC the need to start 2 ENGs (1 and 2) on the stand.
  • Contact operations so that they’re aware in case slot is not met.
  • If electrical power comes from the boarding bridge, consider starting ENGs 3 and 4 first.
  • Apply the SUPP for PNEU START on 2 ENGs first, then apply the SUPP for XBL START on the remaining ENGs.
  • Let Purser know we will start 2 ENGs at the gate, and decide whether you want to arm doors before or after pushback.
  • Consider location of boarding bridges in case of slide deployment if arming before pushback, and consider chance of fire and requirement to evacuate during start of first 2 ENGs if arming after pushback.
  • During PA to PAXs advice of the ABN start.

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4

Q

During APP, around 15 nm (4000 ft), you realize the CAB is not ready yet.
What would you do?

(DoD 1)

A

  • If CABIN NOT READY, only way one can land is if an emergency is declared.
  • Establish contact with CAB. Seek info from the Purser about RQRD time for CAB ready.
  • If cabin is not ready due to medical, ADV ATC, if possible company as well, so medical personnel is ready upon arrival.
  • Discuss options with low fuel state
  • Consider requesting more track miles to avoid a go-around. Keep a close eye on fuel remaining.
  • Debrief will be required afterwards.

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5

Q

On final APP, ATC requests CHG of RWY exit.
What do you do?

(DoD 1)

A

  • Protect FNC
  • If the exit lays before the Dry Line, tell ATC “unable”.
  • If the exit lays in between the Dry and Wet Lines, and the RWY is wet, tell ATC “unable”.
  • If the exit lays beyond the Wet line, discuss ROW activation if BRKing manually (reduce to 30 kts at least 150m BFR the RWY end).
  • A good habit would be to mention during the ARR briefing possible exits AVAIL to gamble.

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6

Q

During APP, you listen the door bell, followed by the ECAM DOOR CKPT DOOR EMER OPENING IN PROGRESS.
What are your actions?

(DoD 1)

A

  • Protect FNC.
  • Lock the door (if not, after 30s the door unlocks for 5s).
  • Call Purser and clarify.
  • In case VPNC calls in unappropriated time, reassure them safety and security was not compromised, and you call them later, or file a report.

Definitely a point to be debriefed after the flight with the cabin crew at an appropriate time.

OM-A 8.3.0.0.2.2 and .3

Sterile flight deck phase starts from final door closure and ends with seat belt sign off.

Sterile flight deck starts when seat belt sign is set ON and ends with door opening.

The NO CONTACT PERIOD starts from Take-off and ends with Gear retraction.

On arrival, NO CONTACT PERIOD starts from gear extension and ends with runway vacated.

Cabin crew should NOT contact the flight crew during the NO CONTACT PERIOD.

In the case of the emergency call, it will buzz 3 times, and the EMER pb-sw on the CALLS panel will flash for 60s at the most or until the Flight Crew answers the call. To cancel it, you must press the RST key (which will light up amber) in the RMP, it will cancel the buzzer and the flashing light.

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7

Q

During APP, the wind is unexpectedly excessively tail. TWR reports 8 kts TL on touchdown.
What are your thoughts?

(DoD 1)

A

  • State not able to fly 160 to 4.
  • Review LDPA stop margin and BRK Energy Risk of tire deflation: low if below 50% = 60% - 4% (taxi) - 5% (residual temp)
  • If BRKs hot, consider dropping the LG earlier.
  • In case LDPA not calculated, or ACFT too heavy (tight stop margin), or RWY not dry, consider go around and request another RWY.

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8

Q

During short final, the APP LGTs fail.

(DoD 1 if day / Dod 2 if dawn)

A

  • Crew might have sufficient visual reference to complete the landing using the aircraft landing lights
  • [OMA Loss of Visual Reference]
    If the Required Visual Reference is lost after passing the DA/H or MDA:
    a. Before touchdown – Conduct a missed approach.
    b. After touchdown – Continue the landing.

According to LIDO-RAR-8.9, if REDL, THRL or RENL are failed, night approaches may not be flown CAT3A or CAT3B. In the US, CAT 3 without them is not allowed either.

There is no effect on the minima during daytime.

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9

Q

During APP, the TWR informs debris on the RWY. What do you do?

(DoD 1)

A

  • Depending on the fuel state, the best action would be a GA.
  • Ask for RWY inspection BFR starting a second APP.
  • PA after the GA.
  • Discuss the policy for a second APP, and commitment to LND.
  • Reconfirm performance for LDG before APP C/L.
    [FCTM]: The flight crew should perform the approach checklist, after revision and/or confirmation of all approach and performance data, before beginning the next approach.

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10

Q

LVOPS – DEBRIS ON RUNWAY

Passing 800’RA on approach

ATC: “Emirates xxx, preceding aircraft just landed reported a large piece of
metal on the runway, left of centreline, LAND at own discretion runway XX”.
Note: ATC call Do NOT use “CLEARED to land”, on first approach

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (P) Application of Procedures

  • A good crew should consider a go-around (depending on fuel status) and
    ask for a runway inspection before flying the second approach
  • If crew does elect to continue the approach, ATC will impose a Go-Around
    at 300 ft RA. After runway inspection, runway is clear

A good Air Traffic Controller will advise the crew to consider a Go-Around.

DO NOT RUSH THE G/A. Perform a mini-brief for the GA if possible. Remember to set the GA altitude before starting the GA. The high energy state will make for a sporty climb, consider use of SOFT GA.

For fuel considerations, consider a visual circuit will likely burn around 2-4 tons, a missed approach from the ground to 4000 feet and short radar vectors will be about 4 tons. Rule of thumb, varies with weight, vectors, altitude for go-around, etc.

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11

Q

You set the box for an ILS APP.
During initial APP, ATC ADVs you GS is INOP, and the AVAIL options are RNAV or LOC ONLY.
You set the RNAV in box, hence a FLS will be flown.
When established on the F-LOC, your PFD displays a red F-LOC & F-GS flags, and the ECAM triggers the LS 1 FAULT alert.
F-LOC and F-G/S modes remain engaged though.
What do you do?

(DoD 2)

A

  • The F-LOC and F-G/S modes remain engaged as AP/FD automatically uses the operative MMR.
  • No need for transfer of control if PF selects ROSE/ILS. LS1 is available in PFD1 and ND2, LS2 is available in PFD2 and ND1.
  • Also consider switching WXR and TAWS to the other system to recover information on VD/ND.

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12

Q

Passing 2500 ft on the APP, ATC states “EK xxx, due to un-identified traffic on the APP descent 2000 ft, turn left (or right) heading xxx deg”.
What are your actions?

(DoD 1)

A

  • DO NOT RUSH THE G/A. Protect FNC.
  • Perform a mini-brief for the GA if possible.
    Remember to set the GA altitude before starting the GA.
  • Discontinued approach Procedure:
    -Announce “Cancel approach”
    -Press APPR or LOC pb
    -Select NAV or HDG as required
    -Select Vertical mode as required (V/S, Descend, OP DES)
    -Select speed and adjust
    -IF F-PLAN has no destination, perform LAT revision and NEW DEST.
  • If below the FCU set altitude, then Go-around procedure has to be used.
  • For fuel considerations, a visual circuit will likely burn around 2t.
    A missed approach from the ground to 4000 feet and short radar vectors will burn about 4t.
    It obviously varies with weight, vectors, altitude for go-around, etc.
  • Perform a PA to reassure PAXs, if time permits.

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13

Q

With approximately 15 track miles, ATC states “EK xxx, preceding 737 is
blocking the runway due to a landing gear problem, change to runway
xx, cleared for approach”.
What do you do?

(DoD 2)

A

Key points:

  • Manage the HI workload
  • Awareness of alternate runways and available type of approaches
  • Good use of SEC FPLN…
  • Depending on the fuel and other failures, consider to discontinue the approach or request further track miles if it becomes the safer option.
  • If SEC FPLAN has the approach and it was briefed accordingly, it would alleviate the workload considerably.
  • If a visual approach may be flown and completed safely, that is also a valid option.
  • Be aware you may get GS warnings if LS remain on.
  • Make sure missed approach procedure is agreed with ATC.
  • Make sure BTV disarmed or classic autobrake selected.

Threats:

  • Runway may be closer (resulting on being high on profile); or farther
  • There may be limited TWYs (NOTAMs, non-surveyed, etc) to vacate.
  • Go Around gradient and missed approach may be higher and may not be met (must tell ATC what to be expected in case of Go-Around)

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14

Q

LOC EXCESSIVE DRIFT Radio Altitude 2000 ft

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Continue for a different approach or G/A
  • (S) If weather and airport permits, fly a non-ILS second approach

The loc flashes if the deviation is more than 1/4 dot for more than 2 seconds.

The GS flashes if the deviation is more than 1 dot for more than 2 seconds.

LOC indication will drift. LOC scale will only flash below 1000 ft RA

Once fault is cleared, AP/FD will guide the aircraft back to the LOC but might infringe on the protected area of max 1 dot (half scale deflection)

If in Visual conditions, and caught early, continuing the approach may be safer than performing a GA. Utilize common sense.

Remember to do a PA to communicate to the crew and reassure the passengers if a Go-Around is flown.

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15

Q

LOC TX FAULT BEFORE INTERCEPT

(Removes the half diamonds on the PFD scale –> when the LOC/GS are above/below the scale)

(DoD 1)

A

  • (S) Lack of LOC scale before intercept
  • (K) System knowledge
  • (A) Use of Automatics

  • LOC Blue will ARM, but if the crew do not detect the anomaly, the aircraft
    will fly through the LOC
  • Once ATC is questioned; state fault is intermittent and CLEAR FAULT
  • If crew do not continue the approach, they can elect to fly a second ILS or
    opt for a different approach if available

If the loc transmitter fails:

-the loc index disappears
-the loc scales flash (only if between 15ft and 200ft RA, and loc, land, or flare is engaged)

The FD bars flash on both PFDs when the tx fails and loc, loc, loc b/c, loc b/c, land or flare are engaged, and above 15ft RA.

Consider the use of an alternate approach if reason for the fault not clearly given or if likely to re-occur.

If the LOC TX fails once LOC, LOC, GS or GS are already active (captured), the autopilot will also disconnect if the failure lasts longer than 7 seconds and the aircraft is above 200ft RA.

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16

Q

PRECEDING AIRCRAFT REPORTS “POOR BRAKING ACTION”

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Braking action is advisory only at EK; presently no guidance in OM-A/C,
    FCOM

When requested, aircraft type of reporter is a Learjet 45
* When runway condition requested: ATC: “Runway is WET”
* Expectation is for the crew to check aircraft type, runway condition and
possible reports of other airports
* Possible change of Auto Brake setting to HI if runway is deemed
contaminated
* Crews should consider recalculating LDPA if conditions have changed
END OF EVENT Event remains until end of Flt

If weight+failures permit, always consider most detrimental conditions (contaminated runway and tailwind) to be prepared for downgrade of conditions while calculating LDPA.

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17

Q

PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR

(tailwind increasing to…) – MODERATE
ACTIVATE PWS PASSING 2000’RA ON FINAL APP

PWS Warning is after the runway, in the missed approach area
* Event should not be used with another Windshear event
* With above setup, expect Advisory (icon/no aural) around 800 ft RA,
Caution “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY around 200 ft RA”

(DoD 1)

A

  • When the PWS alert is triggered the crew should determine its position
    relative to the runway. If decision is to G/A, the crew should ask for a turn to
    avoid the PWS area

“GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”

If the flight crew verifies and confirms that there is no risk of windshear, they may disregard the alert, provided that:

-there are no other signs of possible windshear condition

-the reactive windshear function is operative.

If the reactive windshear activates, a go around MUST be flown.

If a Go-Around is flown, perform PA to reassure passengers and inform cabin crew. Contact ATC about latest weather conditions before initiating another approach, as well as utilize the weather radar. If conditions do not improve and fuel allows, consider an alternate.

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18

Q

RFF CAT REDUCTION ON INITIAL APP

Start when about 15 track miles for landing

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) OM-A, RFF
  • (D) Continue or divert

The RFF required for the A380 is 10 for destinations, 8 for enroute (which can be accepted for Destinations in case of temporary downgrade).
RFF of 6 for Driftdown and Depressurisation.

Having said that, 8.1.2.4.2 says that In-Flight the PIC may land regardless of RFFS category if to do so would be safer than to divert.

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19

Q

SICK PAX ON ARRIVAL (BELOW 15,000 FT ON DESCENT)

  • PURSER advises PAX has collapsed in the forward main deck LAV

(DoD 2)

A

  • (C) Good comms with Cabin crew and ATC
  • (D) Cabin not ready
  • (S) Awareness of being hot and high while dealing with the event

  • Suspected heart-attack, confirmed by doctor, two Cabin Crew performing
    CPR
  • Cabin Ready message is not given by the cabin crew due to sick pax

If CABIN NOT READY, only way one can land is if an emergency is declared. Keep the Cabin Crew informed by letting them know through PA: “Cabin crew 5 minutes for landing”.

Advice ATC, if possible company as well, so medical personnel is ready upon arrival.

Make sure to know why cabin is not ready.

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20

Q

STARTLE WIND (LONG LANDING TAILWIND)

When passing through 150’ AGL the wind gradually turns to tail wind (less
than 10 kts), then shifts to a headwind during the flare (in the order of
10 kts). This tends to cause a long landing

(DoD 1)

A

  • (S) Picking up stronger headwind
  • (D) Decision to continue or go-around

The call whether to “continue” or “Go-around Flaps” rests on the commander.

Few things to consider is the stop margin given by the LDPA and conditions used in calculation.

According to the OM-A 8.3.0.11.7 if touchdown cannot be accomplished within the desired touchdown zone, a go-around should be considered.

The commander should consider the stop margin, runway and environmental conditions, aircraft capability (degraded braking, landing distance affected, etc), failures, fuel status, etc to make a decision whether it is safer to land or go-around if past the touchdown zone.

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21

Q

VORTEX ENCOUNTER (LOW ALT) - Aircraft Upset
Pitch 10° NU/Roll 15° L or R
ACTIVATE at 200’ RA

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Startle and Decision to continue or go-around
  • (H) Possibly demanding handling required if decision to continue is made

Callouts during approach by PM:

Speed: -5kt/+10kt

Pitch: +7deg/-3deg

Bank: +5deg

Sink Rate: 1000ft/min+

The parameters for ground clearance

Pitch: 11.5 compressed, 13.5 extended
(Tailstrike occurs)

Bank: 7.0 degrees
(Wingtip or engine scrape)

Having said that under some pitch and roll combinations contact may occur at as low as 4.4 degrees of bank and 5.4 degrees of pitch.

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22

Q

A/THR OFF ENG 4

ECAM caution only when CLB THR is selected at the THR RED ALT after
takeoff

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (K) Knowledge
  • (D) Continue, Reurn or Divert?

  • An amber LVR ASYM message is displayed on the FMA during cruise and
    descent
  • If THR LVR 4 is selected to IDLE on descent the FMS senses an EO
    condition, a LVR MCT message flashes on the FMA, and every 5 secs an
    ECAM warning AUTO FLT: A/THR LIMITED is triggered. To avoid this, the
    THR LVR 4 can be set slightly above idle
  • A/THR remains available on the other engines throughout the flight
  • Land capability remains unchanged

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23

Q

A/THR THRUST OFF/THRUST LOCKED

On FMA: MAN FLX or MAN TOGA and A/THR in Blue will disappear. ECAM
AUTOFLT A/THR OFF at lift-off

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) ANC prioritization with additional workload for PF
  • (K) AFS
  • (D) Possible diversion due to landing capability

  • THRUST LOCKED will not appear as A/THR is still Armed when fault is
    entered
  • A/THR on all engines is lost for the remainder of the flight
  • There is No STATUS due to Failure detected on the FCU A/THR
    push-button
  • (STD 1.4) In case of alpha floor function activation, ATHR will be triggered
    automatically
  • Landing Capability CAT 2

During all flight phases, except takeoff, if the flight crew does not move the thrust levers within 5s, ENG THRUST LOCKED alert will trigger every 5s.

CAT2 ONLY, loss of CAT3. Manual thrust throughout the remaining of the flight.

The autothrust has 3 channels, one for each PRIM, it will automatically switch master PRIM when the master becomes less capable.

If failure is due to FCU A/THR pushbutton, A/THR may be recovered by using the FCU backup in the MFD and activating the A/THR back from there. Afterwards the FCU backup may be deactivated again.

If performing an autoland, consider that thrust will have to be brought back manually and the “retard” command will be too late. If thrust is not brought back, and extended flare/float will occur.

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24

Q

AUTO FLT FCU FAULT 1+2
Activate just after crew has changed SPD/HDG/ALT on FCU

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (A) Use of Auto flight

  • Computer Reset is available but unsuccessful (3 s OFF then ON)
  • EFIS CTL and FCU BACKUP on MFD are automatically activated
  • FCTM > Abnormal operations > Auto flight has some recommendations
  • Landing capability remains CAT 3 DUAL if no other faults

Reset available, off 3 secs and then back on.

If only AFS CP fails, it says do not reset in flight.

Check targets and Baro after reset.

Use FCU backup on PF side when AP is on, on PM side when handflown.

Each data inserted on BackUp FCU checked in associated peripheral. (call it out)

Use the KCCU SCROLL! DO NOT USE KEYBOARD.

ND mode and range are scrollable. Zoom is not available and OANS cannot be accessed.

BTV is lost and so is ETACs image on the PFDs. If you must use the cameras, you may display them on the Lower Ecam display.

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25

Q

FLIGHT DIRECTOR (FD) FAULT AT ROTATION

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (A) Use of Auto flight

  • FD bars disappear
  • Clear specific malfunction at 50 ft RA
  • Once FD back ON; AFS modes: SPEED mode, HDG, V/S and selected speed

Rotate at 12.5 degrees, maintain speed V2+ 10, DO NOT LET SPEED DROP BELOW V2.

Passing Thrust Reduction altitude, thrust to climb. Passing Accel Altitude, accelerate to 250 kias and clean up on schedule.

Since RNAV compliance is lost, request Radar Vectors from ATC.

MEL 22-10-02A

Select V2 speed

Continue a normal take-off.
Pitch initially 12.5 degrees, keep Take-off thrust until Thrust Reduction altitude.
SPEED MIN V2, MAX V2+10.
At Thrust Reduction altitude, reduce to Climb Thrust. Maintain speed between V2 and V2+10 until out of SRS.
At Acceleration altitude, Set Climb Speed, accelerate to climb speed, initially 10 degrees of pitch. DON’T FORGET TO CLEAN UP!

AUTOTHRUST will not come back at Thrust Reduction.

If ENG OUT, select 10 degres pitch up initially, fly V2, NOT V2+10, after acceleration go to Green Dot.

FDs will NOT re-engage on their own.

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26

Q

AUTO FLT – FMS 1+2 FAULT

AUTO FLT FM FAULT A & B
Activate A+B approaching a FMS waypoint

(DoD 2)

A

  • (A) Awareness of FMA changes
  • (K) System knowledge
  • (P) Ecam handling
  • (C) Communication with VPNC/MCC, Purser/Pax

  • When FMC A & FMC B fail simultaneously, backup FMC C is not able to
    synchronize with an active FMC, no cross-load the navigation information.
    FMC C only for AP operation in basic modes, not for managed modes as it
    contains no flight plan data
  • ECAM warning FMC A+B will be triggered and either FMS 1 FAULT or
    FMS 2 FAULT will be displayed. The remaining FMS will be in SINGLE
    mode and FMS SWTG will be used to select this FMS for both pilots
  • Some EFIS CP controls on the offside are restricted and can only be
    selected from the EFIS CP on the onside FMS. Top row on offside EFIS CP
    will be blanked. CAT 3 DUAL capability should be retained
  • No F-PLN is available so a new plan must be inserted when able. Waypoints
    and airways can be inserted manually
  • FUEL & LOAD ZFW + ZFWCG need to be entered for FMS predictions
  • Reset is not successful

At time of failure, the flight plan will be lost.
FMA will display SPEED/VS/HDG, revert to basic mode. Consider initially switching to TRK/FPA as then the tracking will compensate for wind.

RMP may be used to tune navaids if Navaid page is unavailable. Remember the stby radnav guarded button found on the bottom right side of the RMP. Most likely, the Navaid page will remain available or return soon after failure.

Once ANCs are protected, particularly the Navigation aspect as this will occur close to a waypoint; as well as the ECAM completed; then an ACE can be performed and a computer reset may be attempted.

FMS will be driven by FMC C.

Only reset one FMC at a time by using FMC reset buttons on overhead panel.

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27

Q

AUTO FLT – TCAS MODE FAILS BEFORE TA

  • TCAS Blue will not ARM on TRAFFIC TRAFFIC

(DoD 1)

A

  • It is acceptable if flight crew called “TCAS I HAVE CONTROL”
  • Basic TCAS Procedure. TCAS RA shall be flown manually after AP and FD OFF

Basic TCAS Procedure:

If TCAS green does not engage:

AP - OFF
FDs - OFF
VERTICAL SPEED - ADJUST OR MAINTAIN
avoid the red area, avoid excessive maneuvers, use the full speed range if required (Va Max and V Max)
Respect STALL, GPWS or WSHEAR warnings
ATC - NOTIFY
WHEN CLEAR OF CONFLICT
ATC NOTIFY
LAT AND VERT GUIDANCE - ADJUST
AP/FD - AS REQUIRED

Callouts
“TCAS, I have control”
“Emirates XXX TCAS RA”
“Emirates XXX clear of conflict, resuming FL/ALT”

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28

Q

BOMB ON BOARD – (RED BOMB WARNING)

  • Preferably start event once outside the option to land and evacuate within
    30 mins.
  • Examiners are encouraged to give a realistic time limit. E.g. “the bomb will
    go off in 70 minutes”.

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC and prioritisation with possible other faults
  • (K) OM-A guidance for Bomb on Board
  • (C) Communication with cabin crew
  • (P) ECAM non-sensed procedure

  • Crews should plan on having evacuation complete and all passengers
    (including disabled) at least 200 m away from the aircraft by that time.
  • DATALINK INDEX > AOC > MISC > FREE TEXT: send the following
    message: “A RED BOMB WARNING HAS BEEN MADE AGAINST YOUR
    FLIGHT, LAND ASAP. LOCATION OF POSSIBLE BOMB IS NOT KNOWN.
    VPNC/EK SECURITY”
  • Refer to OM-A 10.4.5. Consideration of using the on board security search
    C/L
  • The event shall be continued till completion; i.e. Pre-cautionary
    disembarkation, Emergency Evacutation, etc…

10.4.5.2 Threat Classification
RED: Represents a specific warning which either identifies a target or is made by a person claiming to be a member of a terrorist organisation and is judged credible.

GREEN: Represents a vague warning which does not identify a target or specific group of targets and lacks credibility.

Note:
Both types of threats are most frequently made anonymously by telephone and invariably turn out to be false.

10.4.5.3 Sabotage/Bomb Threat Procedure
In all cases when a threat has been received and assessed, the operating Commander will be informed. In the event of a threat having been assessed as non-specific (GREEN) there will be no need for any further action to be taken by the operating crew unless they possess any other information that leads the Commander to decide that further action is required.

Sometimes bomb threats will come to the notice of the crew by other means; e.g. from ATC. In such circ*mstances the ability to classify the threat may not be possible or may be undertaken by other authorities without reference to Emirates. In these circ*mstances, Commanders should use their judgement, to achieve a safe and timely outcome, keeping Network Control Centre advised, if possible.

10.4.5.4 Suspicious Article Discovered In Flight
The Commander should proceed as follows:

a.
Follow FCOM/QRH “BOMB on BOARD” Procedures;

The bomb on board ECAM has some interesting training points: there is a conditional statement that requires cabin alt +2500’.

DO NOT increase cabin altitude manually to reduce differential pressure; this option could trigger a pressure sensitive bomb.

  1. Keep ATC fully briefed on flight intentions so that appropriate ground measures can be initiated at the aerodrome of intended landing. If flying time is not excessively increased, request a routing clear of heavily populated areas;
  2. Brief cabin crew to be prepared for a possible emergency landing;
  3. Prepare for possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks;
  4. Consider carefully the choice between flying fast to minimise the airborne time and flying slowly to minimise air-loads and damage in the event of a fuselage rupture. In most cases, the turbulent air penetration speed will be a reasonable compromise;
  5. On contact with the landing aerodrome, request remote parking and confirm the immediate availability of passenger coaches and steps. Advise and impress upon the aerodrome the need to have passengers removed from the aircraft and safely located at least 200 m upwind of the aircraft as quickly as possible;
  6. If time permits make the following PA “This is the Captain, Ladies and Gentlemen, if there is anyone on board with BD or EOD experience, please make themselves known to the crew”.

Note:
The acronym ‘BD’ is for Bomb Disposal and ‘EOD’ for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Only the initials should be used on the PA.

b.
The cabin crew shall refer to the OM-E. Cabin crew are generally familiar with every area of the cabin, and will recognise a suspicious article in any stowage or gallery area, etc.

10.4.5.4.1 Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL)
Flight crew refer to (FCOM/QRH/ECL).

Cabin crew refer to OM-E.

Careful considerations should be made and briefed as to what actions will be after landing.

Consider the following:
-Vacate runway or not?
-Evacuation?
-Precautionary disembarkation using Slides or Stairs?
-Remote location designated for bomb threats at landing airport?
-How to keep passengers safe and 200 meters from aircraft?

For info: Location of search checklist in EPT is in E-Forms under “security forms”

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29

Q

BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT
Activate when RTO Auto Brakes are armed before T/O

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) HOT before T/O
  • (P) ECAM actions, Computer Reset and MEL
  • (K) Brakes
  • (H) Manual Braking

  • NORMAL braking INOP – ALTN braking with anti-skid available
  • BSCS 1(2) computer Reset is not allowed
  • MEL/MEL Items/Preamble/FAILURES PRIOR TO TAKEOFF
  • Automatic roll-out in LVO is allowed, using manual braking
  • HOT consideration if de-iced

ECAM is “crew awareness” only. If you go to the OIT and go to the failure, then annunciations will take you to the MEL. The MEL (32-42-05A) says it is interval C, 0 required, and has an Operational procedure, which tells you that BTV is lost, and that no autobrake mode should be selected. Disregard the blue memo items for TO and Landing related to autobrake.

Consider use of the MEL-MEL Items-Preamble

Because the failure is brake related, the BSCS reset cannot be performed, but for compliance, check the FCOM quickly for a reset.

Communicate with Maintenance if possible.

Take into consideration the Holdover time.

Brief that manual braking shall be used, including the case of an RTO.

Consider possible implications at destination.

30

Q

BRAKES ANTI-SKID FAULT ON ALL LANDING GEAR

Activate anytime above FL200

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of braking system
  • (C) Liaise with VPNC and MCC
  • (D) Decision on most suitable airport given environmental conditions

  • This fault is caused by a total loss of the normal/alternate control system
    (failures of RDCs, tachometers)
  • Antiskid regulation is lost on normal and alternate system
  • Alternate braking without antiskid is possible
  • Hydraulic pressure is automatically limited to 1000 psi on landing
  • Landing distance is affected
  • Land capability CAT 3 SINGLE only
  • No Auto Brake or Anti Skid available
  • At the ACE phase of ECAM a BSCS RESET could be considered, but is not
    allowed for this failure
  • On a wet or contaminated runway, a possibility exists for tire deflation at the
    end of the roll-out
  • MCC can be contacted but are unable to suggest any method of fixing the
    problem. If asked, VPNC recommends to continue flight

Landing distance is limited, even more so in wet or contaminated runways.

The system will automatically limit the braking to 1000 PSI for landing, and 1700 PSI for taxi-out and take-off (Landing brake law vs take-off brake law). After landing it is possible to revert to take-off brake law by applying parking brakes.

Braked pivot turns are not allowed.

Since tire deflation could be a potential issue after landing, exercise care before vacating the runway by checking the wheels page, and perhaps the outside cameras. If there is any doubt as to whether tires have deflated or burst, act accordingly.

If tire burst suspected, consider inspection from fire brigade, telling purser, PA to passengers, contacting the company, towing, etc. Remember that if a tire burst, taxiing is not allowed as opposed to tire deflation.

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31

Q

CDS – PFD DU UNIT FAULT

INDICATING/RECORDING: PFD CDS UNIT
FAULT – PF
IF USED ON T/O: ARM BEFORE T/O, preselect criteria IAS V1+5 KTS,
Choose PF side
IF USED ON APPROACH: preselect criteria Radio altitude 900 ft, Choose
PF side

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Startle effect, quick decision making
  • (K) Switching of CDS Units

  • CAPT (F/O) PFD display is blank
  • CAPT (F/O) PFD image is automatically transferred to CAPT (F/O) ND
  • ECAM: CDS CAPT(F/O) PFD DU FAULT
  • The faulty side can recover the ND image on ND or MFD by using the PFD/
    ND/MFD control push buttons on the CAPT reconfiguration switching
  • No Land capability downgrade as 2 PFD’s are still available

You should transfer control if PFD is not available, the PFD should be automatically transferred to the ND although it will take a second or two. If unable to transfer control for any reason, you may use the ISIS and ask for assistance from the PM.

You can try turning screen off and then back on.

Reconf button may be used to get ND on MFD.

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32

Q

CDS – PFD DU UNIT FAULT

INDICATING/RECORDING: PFD CDS UNIT
FAULT – PF
IF USED ON T/O: ARM BEFORE T/O, preselect criteria IAS V1+5 KTS,
Choose PF side
IF USED ON APPROACH: preselect criteria Radio altitude 900 ft, Choose
PF side

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Startle effect, quick decision making
  • (K) Switching of CDS Units

  • CAPT (F/O) PFD display is blank
  • CAPT (F/O) PFD image is automatically transferred to CAPT (F/O) ND
  • ECAM: CDS CAPT(F/O) PFD DU FAULT
  • The faulty side can recover the ND image on ND or MFD by using the PFD/
    ND/MFD control push buttons on the CAPT reconfiguration switching
  • No Land capability downgrade as 2 PFD’s are still available

You should transfer control if PFD is not available, the PFD should be automatically transferred to the ND although it will take a second or two. If unable to transfer control for any reason, you may use the ISIS and ask for assistance from the PM.

You can try turning screen off and then back on.

Reconf button may be used to get ND on MFD.

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33

Q

CIDS – CABIN COMM FAULT AFTER TAKE-OFF
* ECAM will trigger CAB COM CIDS CABIN COM FAULT UPPER DECK PA FAULT
* A call from the cabin, Purser “The cabin crew from the upper deck is
reporting that the PA is not working on the upper deck”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (C) Communication with Cabin Crew
  • (L) Giving effective direction

  • 5 mins after CIDS 1 RESET…PUSH, cancel the malfunction

Before doing anything, just protect the ANCs. Once ANCs are protected and the workload permits, deal with the fault. ECAM actions, ACE, Computer reset is available under FCOM-PRO-SUPPL-COMP RESET-COMMUNICATIONS.

The FCOM recommends pulling CIDS1, leaving it pulled, then communicating with the crew, afterwards, if the reset was not succesful, push it back in. Time it again, if the push action did not fix it, then you attempt the same with CIDS2, and if not, CIDS3.

Be mindful of the HOT if applicable.

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34

Q

COM – LOSS OF ATC COMMS (GROUND BASED PROBLEM, OUT OF VHF
RANGE)

Anytime in cruise and while not in VHF range

  • Simulates a ground based radio communication problem. Aircraft VHF/HF
    system is fine, but unable to contact ATC if crews calls VHF/HF

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) Where to find SATCOM short codes
  • (P) Loss of comms procedures

  • Use of SLOPS if applicable
  • Crew should try to relay with other aircraft and/or call ATC on SATCOM
    using the LIDO RSI > COM SATCOM short codes

Protect the ANCs, then try to establish communications through other means (121.5, satcom, other VHF radios, and perhaps other frequencies). Attempt also to ask for a relay if possible to check if our own equipment is working.

If just changed to a new frequency, try contacting past frequency on VHF3 to report no joy and request another frequency.

If under CPDLC, you may also send a message requesting for an alternate frequency.

If this occurs near the ground during approach, follow LOSS of COMMS procedures applicable to the country/aerodrome. (AOI, LIDO)

Finally, if in cruise and no contact can be made with other frequencies, other aircraft, or on guard, consider using SATCOM and maybe communicating with ATC/VPNC to avoid interception.

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35

Q

COM – VHF 1 CB TRIPS ON APPROACH

ACTIVATE just before crew expects ATC “cleared for approach”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (S) Anticipation of ATC call
  • (P) Checking of CB page
  • (C) Loss of comms procedure

  • ECAM ELEC C/B TRIPPED will trigger
  • Manual selection of the CB page in order to see which CB has tripped
  • Most crews will be unsure to either turn onto the approach or fly through the
    centreline while sorting out temporarily loss of comms
  • LIDO AOI might give specific procedure for loss of comms on approach
  • Expectation is for the crew to switch to VHF 3 and keep monitoring 121.5
  • ATC will eventually transmit on 121.5 if crew does not change VHF

Keep VHF2 on 121.5, attempt to communicate on VHF 3 or 121.5 if possible.

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36

Q

COND DUCT OVERHEAT – CABIN
ACTIVATE any time above 5000 ft

  • HOT AIR 1 valve closes and OVHT is displayed in amber in the affected
    cabin zone. ECAM will ask to switch HOT AIR 1 OFF. As HOT AIR 1 will
    NOT be jammed OPEN, there is no need to switch the PACK OFF

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) ECAM actions (P)
  • (L) Crew coordination and teamwork required
  • (C) Communication with the cabin crew

  • Crew will need to address the Degraded Cabin temperature control with the
    cabin crew

There’s overheat when the temperature in a duct reaches 70 Degrees Celsius or higher.

It can be a co*ckpit, cabin, or forward cargo duct overheat.

Once the overheat is over, the corresponding hot air valve may be re-opened if not jammed open already.

Advise the cabin that the temperature in the cabin will not be easily controllable since the hot air for that area will be closed, therefore only the PACK will give rudimentary control. In the case where the hot air is jammed open, then losing one pack will mean extremely limited temperature control in that area.

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37

Q

CLB/CRUISE – AIRSPACE AHEAD CLOSED

  • ATC advises that XXXX FIR ahead is closed, time undetermined

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) Task sharing
  • (L) Giving effective directions
  • (C) Communication with ATC, purser and Pax
  • (D) Continue or divert decision

  • If crew contact VPNC, request to land at any A380 destination airport
  • (EK) GUIDELINE FOR ENROUTE DIVERSION

Depending on weather, and conditions, some options available are in the RAIG.

Make sure to use the EK Enroute Diversion checklist in the FCOM as well as OM-A 8.3.0.10.

Ask the questions:
Can we get there? Can we Land there? Can we stop there? Can we turnaround there?

Finally, is it Safe? Is it Legal? Is it Efficient?

Use VPNC to see if they can negotiate flying through the airspace depending on the reason for the closure.

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38

Q

CLB/CRUISE – EXTINGUISHABLE LI BATT FIRE (iPHONE BLOCKED IN
SEAT)

  • Any time above FL250: CSV (Upper deck): “Captain, a passenger in
    Business class (18E) dropped his iPhone inside the seat
    compartment. After it got stuck, the seat was moved and now there is
    some smoke coming from the seat”

(DoD 2)

A

  • (C) Good comms with cabin crew/PA to the PAX (Upper deck only)
  • (S) Planning for possible diversion if needed
  • (K) Use of FireSock as part of SEP training

  • Possible activation of the ABN SMOKE/FIRE PROC, which will eventually
    guide the crew to the QRH
  • When called for update (minimum 3 min after initial call): CSV (Upper deck):
    “Captain, we discharged one halon, I think the fire is extinguished.
    Smoke is dissipating now. We will move the passenger and we did
    manage to take the phone out with an ice tong. We will put it in the
    toilet at UL3”
  • The cabin crew should be prompted to monitor the seat and use the
    FireSock in accordance with OM-E 4.2.6.8. Before doing so the item needs
    to be cooled with water for 15 secs. The item should then be left on the floor
    of a toilet and regularly checked afterwards

Do not move phone until fire/smoke out with halon extinguisher. Douse with water for at least 15 seconds. Use the firesock, as well as the protective gloves. Do it quickly and seal it, then use handle and secure in a non-flammable surface and monitor for 15 minutes. After that, put all items including gloves into metallic container and inside a lavatory. Make sure someone checks on it at least every 30 minutes.

Also, use the checklist found in the QRH!

The cabin crew should be prompted to monitor the seat and use the FireSock in accordance with OM-E 4.2.6.8. Before doing so the item needs to be cooled with water for 15 secs. The item should then be left on the floor of a toilet and regularly checked afterwards

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39

Q

CLB/CRUISE – LOADSHEET ERROR ZFW + 5.5 T (ACARS FROM LOAD
CONTROL)

DATALINK UPLINKS>AOC>MISC: VPNC MSSG
stating: “Loadsheet error, ZFW +5.5 T, wrong container FWD CARGO. CG
is out of FWD CG LIMIT”
Activate anytime in cruise

(DoD 2)

A

Event remains until end of Flt Max THS deflection 2 ND 10 NU

  • (D) Continue – Divert – Return
  • (S) Resilience on dealing with a non-documented problem

  • The aircraft might be above Max Structural Weights (i.e. MZFW, MLW)
  • If new weight > MLW; overweight landing checklist to be done
  • If questioned, loadcontrol can not calculate exact CG
  • Loadsheet application will not compute weights above maximums
  • FUEL CG and WEIGHT DATA DISAGREE ECAM is triggered when weights
    calculated by the WBBC (Weight Balance Backup Computer) differs by
    more than 8% or 90 T
  • Due consideration should be given to fuel consumption, correct speeds,
    actual CG, option of moving pax to the back of the aircraft, Flaps 3 LDG
  • Refer to RAIG Performance > Appendix F and OM-A 8.1.8.5.4

Whenever the Commander suspects that the weight or balance of an aeroplane is in error, either by virtue of its handling qualities or poor performance, he should take the following actions:

a.
Where possible maintain the aeroplane within the safe operating envelope and buffet margin for the remainder of the flight.

b.
If time allows, contact VPNC and request additional support (Flight Operations Performance, Flight Dispatch, Tech Pilot). The RAIG Performance Annex F provides some considerations for inflight management.

c.
After landing, ensure the ASM/GHA is aware of the need for weighing of all cargo and baggage and provide an update to VPNC.

d.
Make an entry in the Aircraft Technical Log for ‘Suspected Inaccurately Loaded Aeroplane’ with details of the handling/performance symptoms.

A forward CG out of limits will have some effects such as:

  1. Increased longitudinal stability due to the aircraft being nose heavy.
  2. Reduced pitch control due to the aircraft’s long taiplane moment arm.
  3. More elevator or stabilizer input, therefore:
    a. Increased wing angle of attack and higher induced drag, reducing performance and range.
    b. Increased stalling speed due to the larger amount of “negative lift” required from the tail, which effectively is equivalent to a higher weight.
    c. Less available pitch authority for flare
    d. In flight minimum speeds are restricted due to lack of elevator available to maintain high AOA.
  4. Aircraft will be heavy and less responsive, and larger controls inputs required for landing, particularly in flare law.

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40

Q

CLB/CRUISE – OVERSPEED

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Application of overspeed recovery or overspeed prevention procedure
  • (S) Monotoring the speed trend

  • In accordance with OM-A policy (8.3.8.4), Seat Belt sign should be switched
    ON and Cabin Crew informed
  • For correct overspeed prevention refer to: FCOM > PROC > ABN & EMRG
    PROC > OPERATING TECHN > OVERSPEED PREVENTION/
    RECOVERY
  • After the overspeed event, turbulence will reduce back to a normal level

Overspeed Prevention:

If significant speed variations encountered close to VMO/MMO:

AP and A/THR keep on
Use selected speed to reduce speed (MIN GDOT)
Monitor speed trend
If the speed trend approaches or exceeds VMO/MMO use the Speed brake Lever as required.

If MMO/VMO is exceeded, then apply the Overspeed Recovery:

AP keep on
Speed brake lever as required (speed envelope is reduced)
Monitor the thrust reduction
If A/THR is off, bring thrust to idle.
If AP disengages, High Speed protection will be active if in normal law.
You will have to use speed brake and adjust the Pitch ATT.
Afterwards, recover flight path, speed brake and thrust back to normal.

The automatic extension of speedbrakes happens if speeds goes above VMO/MMO -5kt and:
-Above 28000
-AP and ATHR are ON
-ALT, ALT CST, ALT CRZ are engaged.
It will only command 3/4 speed brake (equivalent to halfway detent) and only crew can command full speedbrake. If crew commands retraction of speedbrakes under the above circ*mstances, they will not retract below the PRIM order.

In case of Severe Turbulence:
Activate Misc Sever Turbulence in cruise

Prevention=Select speed
Recovery=Speedbrake

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41

Q

CLB/CRUISE – RUNWAY CLOSED DUE TO AIRCRAFT BLOCKING THE
RUNWAY

  • At Top of Descent ATC: “Emirates XX, we have just been informed by
    the tower that an aircraft has stopped on runway XX at XXX with a
    brake problem, for the moment delay is undetermined”
  • If crew requests an update, runway remains blocked with unknown delay
  • No other runway available at airport

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Return/Divert
  • (K) OM-A commit to destination

OM-A 8.3.7.2 refers to In-flight Fuel management.

A. If EAT known, may continue to destination if possible to land with final reserve fuel remaining.

B. If EAT NOT KNOWN!, may continue to destination if possible to reach 2 aerodromes with final reserve, if that won’t be possible, then cannot continue. Instead of 2 aerodromes, 1 aerodrome with 2 separate and independent runways within 2 hours may be used, but then you must allow fuel for any ATC delays.

A landing is assured when weather and any plausible single failure of ground or airborne facilities is considered. For weather, within 2 hours METARs may be used with trend information, if more than 2 hours, TAFs.

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42

Q

CLB/CRUISE – SEVERE TURBULENCE – INJURED CREW OR PAX

  • Gradual increase of turbulence over 30 s (LIGHT–MOD–SEV)
  • After 30 s AIRCRAFT UPSET 15° NU & 33° L
  • Activate in Climb above FL200, preferably in IMC

(DoD 2)

A

  • (C) Advise cabin crew INT and/or PA
  • (M) Workload management during diversion

  • Observe use of seat belt signs and cabin crew comms
  • Sim testing has shown that AP remains engaged throughout the upset
  • After upset, role play female CSV in business class or one injured pax has
    severe head injury
  • Ground Medical Support will be called from cabin if crew requests
  • Ground Medical Support advises immediate diversion to nearest suitable.
    Crew to decide on diversion airport

PROTECT ANCs first, make sure there’s no wshear or wx on ND. If time permits, consider activating Misc Severe Turbulence in cruise from ABN.

As soon as turbulence begins, turn-on seatbelt sign. PA “This is the captain, cabin crew please take your seats”.

Cabin crew injury = advice NCC via ACARS depending on injury (broken arm and bleeding is not the same as sprained finger).
Ground Medical Services must be contacted.
Consider information given by Ground Medical Services, as well as suggestions and compare with weather at different airports.

Advise ATC, passengers if diverting, as well as NCC and cabin crew.

Make sure to use the EK Enroute Diversion checklist in the FCOM as well as OM-A 8.3.0.10.

Depending on the weight, overweight landing and jettison checklists to be considered. If jettison, monitor CG carefully and get VPNC involved.

If it occurs during a Polar Flight:

OM-A 8.3.2.4.2.7


Communications are susceptible to outage in the Polar region and therefore the following aerodromes are designated diversion aerodromes and are provided as a guideline should a diversion be required before communication with NCC has been established.

A diversion decision will invoke the “Polar Recovery Plan.” This plan is an integrated corporate and industry effort to attend to the immediate care of passengers and crew with their recovery within 24 hours.

Environmental conditions in the Polar Area can be extreme which may hamper ground and passenger handling and hinder flight operations together with limited facilities.

Flight crew should therefore take into consideration the weather conditions, fuel/time available and the technical status of the aircraft and consider continuing the flight to an aerodrome outside the Polar Area according to the prevalent situation.

A list of the most suitable diversion aerodromes is published in the OM-C.

RAIG 2.10.11
Polar Operations – A380, Medical Diversion

The company preferred diversion aerodromes, subject to operational conditions on the day, the actual position of the aircraft and the shortest time, are as follows:

  1. For flights south of 60 degrees North, Easterly latitudes:

UUDD or Air Turn Back to DXB.

  1. For flights above 60 degrees North:

ESSA/EFHK/EDDH/BIKF/PANC.

  1. For flights below 60 degrees North, Westerly latitudes:

CYEG/CYWG/CYVR

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43

Q

CLB/CRUISE – VERBALLY ABUSIVE PASSENGER (J CLASS)

  • During cruise. CSV “A drunk passenger is shouting and insulting the
    passenger next to him”
  • Refer to OM-A “Disruptive

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) Task sharing
  • (L) Giving effective directions
  • (C) Communication with the Cabin Crew
  • (K) OM-A/OM-E

  • Refer to OM-A “Disruptive Passengers” and OM-E
  • After receiving the formal warning from the purser, the passenger will stop
    being disruptive passenger(Event ends after the formal warning)

Disruptive = Ground
Unruly = After door closure

OM-A 8.2.2.2.14
It is a passenger:
A- Who imperils the safety of the aircraft, passenger or crew
B- Whose conduct or mental or physical state is such as to cause discomfort or make him objectionable to other passengers, or involve any hazard or risk to the passenger or to other persons or property.
C- Who fails to observe instructions from EK Staff.

OM-A 8.2.2.2.15 deals with the use of PAX Restraining devices.

OM-A 8.2.3 Deals with procedures for Passenger Offload

If the incident of disruptive PAX takes place in flight, the commander is empowered to offload the PAX at the next scheduled place of landing or, in extreme situations, to divert to the nearest suitable aerodrome and offload the pax there.

If the Commander wishes to offload, he should request local police to meet the aircraft and assist in the offloading. Checked baggage of the pax should also be offloaded. The commander is responsible for this decision.

Captain’s Special Report must be completed with details.

OM-A 20.12.3
This section of the OM-A gives some guidelines on how to deal with Passenger Misconduct.
The Commander will delegate the Purser and Senior Cabin Crew, may also ask assistance from able-bodied passengers, and under no circ*mstance should become directly involved in any direct contact with the disruptive PAX.
Where circ*mstances allow, before taking any final action a VERBAL WARNING must be given.
The following violate the law:
1. Apparent intoxication
2. Being obviously under the influence of drugs (except medical care)
3. Threatening another pax or crew with physical violence.
4. Indecent exposure or proposals
5. Theft
6. Carrying an unauthorized deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or not.
7. Interfere with safety of a crew member.
8. Conveying false information concerning the flight and its safety.
9. Committing or attempting to commit an act of aerial piracy.
The Commander is responsible that policy is applied and written reports are submitted by crew involved.
Refusal of carriage or onward carriage and or legal action may be taken against the Passenger.

OM-A 20.12.3.1
Abusive or Suggestive Language
Although disturbing and offensive, not necessarily a hazard to safety or security. If no threat of violence or physical attack, it is NOT considered assault.
The objective is to calm the passenger down and avoid confrontation.

OM-E 10.4
Disruptive/Unruly behaviour
OM-E 10.4.3.1
Verbal Abuse, Including abusive or suggestive language.

OM-E 10.3.4.5
FORMAL WARNING
“On behalf of the Captain, your behaviour is unacceptable. If it continues, we will be forced to take further necessary action against you.”
The Formal Warning is a legal statement. The Formal Warning must be given:
-when all attempts at disruptive/unruly behaviour management have failed
-if the passenger is continuously disruptive
-before taking any direct action against a disruptive passenger
-verbally
-in English, translate if required
-once only
-assertively in front of other passengers
-with the Captain’s permission
-by the Purser or Cabin Supervisor
*if urgently required, it may be given by any
Cabin Crew without the Captain’s permission.
The captain must then be informed immediately

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44

Q

CLB/CRUISE – WEATHER AVOIDANCE – RESTRICTED AIRSPACE

During cruise activate a storm cloud on the flight-plan track minimum
100 nm ahead of the aircraft and that will require a significant deviation
of track

  • When weather deviation is requested, ATC states: “Deviation not allowed
    due to military restricted area”

(DoD 2)

A

  • (L) Use of commanders emergency authority
  • (S) Awareness of safest option depending on circ*mstances

  • Crews shall consider other options such as a turn back or declaring a
    PANPAN
  • If storm does not show up on WXDR, perform a AESS Computer Reset on
    the RESETS/FREEZES IOS page

OM-A 8.3.8.2

Strong Weather radar echoes shall be avoided by at least 10nm at or below FL200, or at least 20nm above FL200.

LIDO ​2.3.5 Weather Deviation Procedures​

2.3.5.1
General​
The following procedures are intended for deviations around adverse meteorological conditions.​When the pilot initiates communications with ATC, a rapid response may be​ obtained by stating “WEATHER​ DEVIATION ​ REQUIRED”​ ​ to ​ indicate ​ that ​ priority ​ is ​ desired ​ on ​ the ​ frequency ​ for ​ ATC ​ response. ​
When​ necessary, the pilot should initiate the communications using the urgency call “PAN PAN” (preferably spoken​three times).​
The pilot shall inform ATC when weather deviation is no longer required, or when a weather deviation has​ been completed and the ACFT has returned to its cleared route.​

2.3.5.2
Actions to be Taken When Controller-Pilot Communications are Established
​The pilot should notify ATC and request clearance to deviate from track, advising, when possible, the extent​ of the deviation expected. ​
ATC should take one of the following actions:​
a)​ when appropriate separation can be applied, issue clearance to deviate from track; or
​b)​ if there is conflicting traffic and ATC is unable to establish appropriate separation, ATC shall: ​-​ advise the pilot of inability to issue clearance for the requested deviation;​-​ advise the pilot of conflicting traffic; and​-​ request the pilot’s intentions.​
The pilot should take the following actions:​
a)​ comply with the ATC clearance issued; or
​b)​ advise ATC of​ intentions and execute the procedures detailed under “Actions to be Taken if a Revised​ ATC Clearance Cannot be Obtained”.​

2.3.5.3
Actions to be Taken if a Revised ATC Clearance Cannot be Obtained​
Note:​ The provisions of this section apply to situations where a​ pilot needs to exercise the authority of a PIC​ under the provisions of ICAO Annex 2, 2.3.1.

If clearance ​cannot be obtained, an ATC clearance shall be obtained at the earliest possible time. Until an​ ATC clearance​ is received, the pilot shall take the following actions:​
a)​ if possible, deviate away from an organized track or route system;​
b)​ establish communications with and alert nearby​ ACFT by broadcasting, at suitable intervals: ACFT​identification, flight level, position (including​ ATS route designator or the track code)​ and intentions,​on the frequency in use and on 121.500MHZ (or, as a backup, on the inter-pilot air-to-air frequency​123.450MHZ);​
c)​ watch for conflicting traffic both visually and by reference to ACAS (if equipped);​Note:​ If, as a result of actions taken under provisions of b) and c) above, the pilot determines that ​there is another ACFT at or near the same flight level with which a conflict may occur, then the pilot is ​expected to adjust the path of the ACFT, as necessary, to avoid conflict.​
d)​ turn on all ACFT exterior lights (commensurate with appropriate operating limitations);​
e)​ for deviations of less than 10NM (19km) remain at a level assigned by ATC;​
f)​ for deviations greater than 10NM (19km), when​ the ACFT is approximately 10NM (19km) from track,​initiate a level change in accordance with the table below (300 ft climb if deviating to the south of the airway, 300 ft descend if deviating north of the airway)
​g)​ when returning to track, be at its assigned flight level when the ACFT is within approximately 10NM​(19km) of the centerline; and
​h)​ if ​ contact ​ was​ ​ not ​ established ​ prior ​ to ​ deviating, ​ continue ​ to ​ attempt ​ to ​ contact ​ ATC ​ to ​ obtain ​ a​clearance. If contact was established, continue to keep ATC advised of intentions and obtain essential​traffic information

Finally, you may consider the option of a 360 while awaiting clearance if weather and fuel allows it. If time permits, contact operations to liaise with the ATSU.

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45

Q

DOOR – LEAK (ML1)

CAB PRESS DOOR LEAK – 500 ft/min
Activate in the Climb, above FL300

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P)/(K) Supplementary procedure to be followed
  • (S) Partial cabin pressurization, no need to descent to FL100

  • As a Cabin altitude climb is normal during climb, the leak will likely take time
    to be detected
  • At 10,000 ft, the cabin altitude stabilizes below 8000 ft as the aircraft is still
    partially pressurized; i.e. Packs ON. FL150 should keep the Cabin ALT just
    below 9500 ft
  • FCOM > Procedures > Supplementary Procedures > (EK) Slow Cabin
    Depressurization should be followed

A quick way to tell whether pressurization is under control or not is to check whether the Cabin V/S and Cabin Altitude targets are being met. If they are not, then there is no positive control over pressurization.

Likely the first indication will be an ECAM Advisory.

If CAB PRESS EXCESS CAB ALT alerts then follow the ECAM without delay.

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46

Q

DOOR – MAIN SLIDE FAULT (ML1) IN FLT

DOOR – MAIN SLIDE FAULT (NOT ARMED)
– MAIN 1L
Activate anytime in climb above FL100

(DoD 1)

A

  • (C) Good comms with cabin crew
  • (S) Actions in case of EVAC

  • ECAM DOOR MAIN 1L SLIDE FAULT will trigger; slide indication remains
    armed
  • After ECAM actions have started CSV calls: “Captain the ML1 Door shows
    disarmed in amber on the FAP. Not sure if I can disarm and arm again in
    flight?”
  • CCOM (OPS Library) – Cabin Crew Bulletin CCB2 – Main deck slide arming
    difficulties, provides additional info
  • Slide fault remains after re-arming
  • Flight-deck crew should brief Cabin crew on what to do in case of EVAC

The ECAM requirement is to advice cabin crew that the slide is inoperative for evacuation.

In phase 1 and 12, protection is lost against inadvertent slide inflation.

The CCB includes the procedure to disarm and re-arm the door. This procedure can be applied on ground or during flight. It is recommended the purser monitors the FAP main deck door/slides FAP page during flight and before landing.

If slide fails in armed position, advise vpnc to not open the door upon arrival and that the cabin crew should guard it on ground to avoid accidental deployment.

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47

Q

FWD CARGO NOT CLOSED

DOOR – FWD CARGO DOOR NOT CLOSED
Anytime in the climb above 18,000 ft

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) Knowledge
  • (A) Communication
  • (D) Continue, return, divert

  • This failure is caused by a faulty switch and not by the cargo door opening.
    Therefore no loss of cabin pressure occurs
  • An ECAM warning will trigger and the FWD CARGO DOOR will indicate
    open on the SD page
  • Crew will use AAM to determine the status of the aircraft and that the
    pressurisation system is operating normally. They may ask the cabin crew
    if any abnormal indications exist in the cabin are the area of the forward
    cargo door. They may contact MCC, who will report all indications are
    normal
  • The crew will then assess and make their decision to continue the flight

Check that the Cabin V/S is normal, consider stopping the climb to troubleshoot if there is any doubts.

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48

Q

ELEC – DRIVE OIL PRESS LO

ELECTRICAL (AC) – DRIVE OIL PRESS LO
(4)
Activate anytime after take-off

  • ECAM displays ELEC DRIVE 4 OIL PRESS LO

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Correct ECAM handling
  • (K) Landing capability with 3 and 4 GEN’s available

  • DRIVE Disconnect is requested, if not done DRIVE disconnects after 5 mins
  • Landing capability remains CAT 3 SINGLE if APU GEN not available

You have 5 minutes before the drive automatically disconnects.

Consider use of APU to regain capability.

Remember APU limitations of max M0.56 and 20000 feet.

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49

Q

ENG ADVISORIES: HI VIBRATIONS IN ICING CONDITIONS

ENGINE ADVISORIES: HI VIBRATIONS
MULTIPLE ENGINES DUE TO ICING
Activate any time entering inflight icing conditions. Select at least 2
engines.

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of ice shedding procedure and engine advisories.
  • (C) Liaise with ATC, Airport authorities if on ground. Communication with
    other CM, Crew and Pax if required.
  • (SA) Awareness of high thrust settings on ground. Performance
    considerations when changing engine thrust settings inflight.

  • An increase of N1 vibration in icing conditions, with or without engine antiice,
    may be due to fan blades and/or spinner icing.
  • To shed ice, it may be necessary to perform several engine run-ups for
    approximately 6 min.
  • During each engine run-up, increase thrust up to an appropriate setting for
    the flight phase. After each engine run-up, vibrations should decrease
    indicating the progress of the ice shedding.
  • When the ice is shed, vibrations should return to normal and the flight crew
    can resume normal engine operation.

(Event remains until ice shedding procedure has been completed or engine
shutdown is considered)

Consider activating ABN PROC- ENG HIGH VIB

ECAM should be activated when VIB>5 units.

N1 vibrations will generally produce airframe vibration, while N2 can occur without it being felt in the airframe.

The burning smell is when the compressor blade tip makes contact with the associated abradable seals.

Check engine parameters, especially EGT, and xcheck with other engines.

Icing may produce vibration as well, consider the use of engine anti-ice.

Remember that FZFG should prompt you to execute the Ground Ice Shedding Procedures on ground found in FCOM PRO-NOR-SOP-90.

IF ICING CONDs:
An increase of N1 vibration in icing conditions, with or without engine anti-ice, may be due to fan blades and/or spinner icing.

A/THROFF
ALL ENGs (ONE BY ONE)IDLE THEN INCREASE
TO SHED ICE, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO PERFORM SEVERAL ENGINE RUN-UPS FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 MIN.
DURING EACH ENGINE RUN-UP, INCREASE THRUST UP TO AN APPROPRIATE SETTING FOR THE FLIGHT PHASE. AFTER EACH ENGINE RUN-UP, VIBRATIONS SHOULD DECREASE INDICATING THE PROGRESS OF THE ICE SHEDDING.
WHEN THE ICE IS SHED, VIBRATIONS SHOULD RETURN TO NORMAL AND THE FLIGHT CREW CAN RESUME NORMAL ENGINE OPERATION.

Also consider an altitude change to get out of icing conditions, if ATC does not cooperated, consider using PAN PAN.

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50

Q

ENG – EGT OVERLIMIT

  • ECAM will trigger ENG X EGT OVER LIMIT shortly after T/O

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (P) ECAM actions
  • (D) Return, continue, divert
  • (C) Communication with MCC and PA for passengers

  • EA EGT indication becomes red when it exceeds red line limit 1002°C
    During throttle reduction to idle following the ECAM procedure, EGT
    decreases but stays above amber limit
  • (RR) EGT indication becomes red when EGT exceeds red line limit 900°C.
    After reducing thrust lever, EGT can decrease but remains above red line
    limit
  • If MCC was contacted, request the chain of events of the failure
  • LDG DIST affected, if runway is wet or contaminated
  • If REPOS becomes required; check fuel distribution is realistic

Triggering Conditions for ECAM:

-The EGT is :
-above the redline (TO or GA, Thrust revs selected, or alpha-floor).
-above the EGT limit when THR lever is AT or BELOW MCT.

If reducing the THR lever brings the EGT below the limit, normal operation may be resumed, but if overlimit persists, then Engine should be shutdown if performance and conditions permit the safe conduct of the flight.

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51

Q

ENG – FAIL (BIRD INGESTION ON ROTATION)

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (D) Return, continue, divert

  • Only triggers if N1 > 78% (RR N1 > 68%). All engine parameters move
    erratically for 30 secs only; EGT fluctuates (no exceedance), N1 VIB
    reaches Advisory threshold. Sound effect
  • ECAM ENG X STALL inhibited from V1 to 400 ft
  • After 30 sec stall effects disappear, N1 & EGT return to nominal operation
  • If MCC is contacted; state no exceedance of EGT and N1 have been
    uplinked; decision to increase thrust is left to the commander

After V1:
TAKEOFF - Continue
Directional Control - use rudder

At VR:
Rotation - perform (initial pitch 10 degrees, then SRS orders follow)
Min Speed - V2
(SRS orders will give V2 if failure on ground; or current speed at time of failure if after lift-off)

Before Thrust Reduction Altitude:
Caution - Takeoff thrust max 10 mins
When in positive climb:
Landing gear - up
beta target - center (blue index, available when flaps higher than 0)
Thrust - as appropriate (consider TOGA)
When convenient:
Rudder trim - set
AP - As required

Also, contact ATC (mayday, PAN PAN), activate secondary, or request vectors.

At 400ft MINI
ECAM procedure - Apply

At EO ACCEL Altitude
Altitude - hold

At F Speed - Flaps 1 - select

At S Speed
Flaps zero - select
Sideslip - center (yellow index)

At Green Dot Speed
Speed - maintain Green dot
Altitude - CLIMB to cleared altitude
Thrust Levers - MCT

Stop ECAM once engine is secured to clean up
Engine is secured if:
No damage - Eng Master SW off
Damage - Agent 1 discharged
Fire - Fire is out or both agents discharged

Once aircraft is clean, Green Dot and climbing, continue the ECAM.

Stop at STATUS, consider ACE (After take-off/Climb CL, Computer Resets, Engine Relight).

If no engine relight, and ACE performed, Continue ECAM.

Loss landing capability may be recovered through the use of APU.

For approach, try to use the autopilot to minimize the workload. Consider overweight checklist if appropriate. In anticipation for landing, once the autopilot is disconnected and close to touchdown, request rudder trim zero.

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52

Q

ENG – FAIL (FLAME OUT AT V1) + RELIGHT

ENG FAIL (NO DAMAGE) – ENG 1
or 4

  • DoD 1 IF AUTO-RELIGHT: CLEAR FAULT when ENG FAIL ECAM
    appears 15 sec after lift-off
  • DoD 2 IF RELIGHT IN FLIGHT: CLEAR FAULT after ENG MASTER IS
    OFF

Event can be used for Maneouvre Validation

A

  • (M) ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (S) Auto relight
  • (D) Return, continue, divert

  • Crew shall observe the engine parameters at the “Autorelight in progress”
    prompt
  • When MCC is consulted, MCC states, “No parameters have been
    exceeded, looks like a temporarily glitch in the FADEC. Restart can be
    attempted and engine used for the remainder of the flight if successful”

After V1:
TAKEOFF - Continue
Directional Control - use rudder

At VR:
Rotation - perform (initial pitch 10 degrees, then SRS orders follow)
Min Speed - V2
(SRS orders will give V2 if failure on ground; or current speed at time of failure if after lift-off)

Before Thrust Reduction Altitude:
Caution - Takeoff thrust max 10 mins
When in positive climb:
Landing gear - up
beta target - center (blue index, available when flaps higher than 0)
Thrust - as appropriate (consider TOGA)
When convenient:
Rudder trim - set
AP - As required

Also, contact ATC (mayday, PAN PAN), activate secondary, or request vectors.

At 400ft MINI
ECAM procedure - Apply

At EO ACCEL Altitude
Altitude - hold

At F Speed - Flaps 1 - select

At S Speed
Flaps zero - select
Sideslip - center (yellow index)

At Green Dot Speed
Speed - maintain Green dot
Altitude - CLIMB to cleared altitude
Thrust Levers - MCT

Stop ECAM once engine is secured to clean up
Engine is secured if:
No damage - Eng Master SW off
Damage - Agent 1 discharged
Fire - Fire is out or both agents discharged

Once aircraft is clean, Green Dot and climbing, continue the ECAM.

Stop at STATUS, consider ACE (After take-off/Climb CL, Computer Resets, Engine Relight).

If no engine relight, and ACE performed, Continue ECAM.

Loss landing capability may be recovered through the use of APU.

For approach, try to use the autopilot to minimize the workload. Consider overweight checklist if appropriate. In anticipation for landing, once the autopilot is disconnected and close to touchdown, request rudder trim zero.

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53

Q

ENG – FAIL (SERIOUS DAMAGE AT V1)

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (D) Return, continue, divert

  • Event can be used for Maneouvre Validation
  • Simulates an engine failure with serious damage, i.e. ENG blade
    disintegration
  • If N1 > 78%, all engine parameters move erratically; ENG X OIL TEMP HI,
    ENG X STALL trigger, followed by eventually ENG X FAIL

After V1:
TAKEOFF - Continue
Directional Control - use rudder

At VR:
Rotation - perform (initial pitch 10 degrees, then SRS orders follow)
Min Speed - V2
(SRS orders will give V2 if failure on ground; or current speed at time of failure if after lift-off)

Before Thrust Reduction Altitude:
Caution - Takeoff thrust max 10 mins
When in positive climb:
Landing gear - up
beta target - center (blue index, available when flaps higher than 0)
Thrust - as appropriate (consider TOGA)
When convenient:
Rudder trim - set
AP - As required

Also, contact ATC (mayday, PAN PAN), activate secondary, or request vectors.

At 400ft MINI
ECAM procedure - Apply

At EO ACCEL Altitude
Altitude - hold

At F Speed - Flaps 1 - select

At S Speed
Flaps zero - select
Sideslip - center (yellow index)

At Green Dot Speed
Speed - maintain Green dot
Altitude - CLIMB to cleared altitude
Thrust Levers - MCT

Stop ECAM once engine is secured to clean up
Engine is secured if:
No damage - Eng Master SW off
Damage - Agent 1 discharged
Fire - Fire is out or both agents discharged

Once aircraft is clean, Green Dot and climbing, continue the ECAM.

Stop at STATUS, consider ACE (After take-off/Climb CL, Computer Resets, Engine Relight).

If no engine relight, and ACE performed, Continue ECAM.

Loss landing capability may be recovered through the use of APU.

For approach, try to use the autopilot to minimize the workload. Consider overweight checklist if appropriate. In anticipation for landing, once the autopilot is disconnected and close to touchdown, request rudder trim zero.

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54

Q

ENG – FUEL FILTER CLOGGED THEN ENG X OIL TEMP HI

Activate anytime in cruise

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (D) Return/Divert/Continue

  • If a lower FL is requested without PANPAN/MAYDAY, tell the crew to STBY
  • Once thrust is reduced, possibly lower 1 E/O level
  • Performance penalties apply due loss of REV on wet/contaminated RWY
  • If VPNC is contacted, request the chain of events of technical failures
  • Crew decision to be made on return/divert/continue
  • Landing capability remains CAT 3 SINGLE if APU GEN not available
  • If REPOS becomes required; check fuel distribution is realistic

Oil Temp Limitations:

Max Continuous Temp: 177 degrees (ECAM trigger) for 5 secs or 163 degrees (Advisory trigger) during 20 minutes!

TIME CHECK right away once advisory, and during ECAM be swift to shut down engine after thrust reduction if the oil temperature does not decrease immediately.

Consider use of APU to regain capability.

After engine shutdown, remember the LDPA will have a penalty without the reverser in contaminated/wet runways if ENG 2 or 3 affected.

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55

Q

ENG – HI N1 VIB (REDUCED POWER)

EA (RR) – ENGINE ADVISORIES N1
VIBRATION INC/DEC ENG X
Initially set N1 VIB level to 7 units (ECAM Advisory > 5 units)
Activate preferably when starting a step climb or just before TOC

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) ABN NON SENSED PROC
  • (M) ANC when reducing thrust
  • (D) Return/Divert/Continue
  • (K) Fuel predictions/FCOM Advisory

  • Abnormal Not-Sensed “ENG > HI VIBRATIONS” Procedure should be
    activated and ECAM actions completed
  • If a lower FL is requested without PANPAN/MAYDAY, tell the crew to STBY
  • Once thrust is reduced below 50% THR, reduce ENG X N1 VIB level to 3.5
  • The flight should continue towards destination. If MCC is called, advise the
    crew the fault was downloaded and it looks like all parameters are stable
  • If CSV is called again, state that “the smell is gone and the vibration is
    still there but less than before”
  • If the crew elect to increase ENG X thrust again to exceed 50% THR (e.g.
    in a Go-Around), reset N1 VIB to 7 units
  • FMC Fuel predictions will not be reliable
  • If REPOS becomes required; check fuel distribution is realistic

ECAM should be activated when VIB>5 units.

N1 vibrations will generally produce airframe vibration, while N2 can occur without it being felt in the airframe.

The burning smell is when the compressor blade tip makes contact with the associated abradable seals.

Check engine parameters, especially EGT, and xcheck with other engines.

Icing may produce vibration as well, consider the use of engine anti-ice.

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56

Q

ENG – MANUAL START DUE TO MEL

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) MEL Application
  • (K) Lack of protections during Manual start

  • Provide Tech Log ADD ENG IGN FAULT to the crew
  • Event simulates an intermittent IGN A Fault on ENG X; MEL 74-31-01A (O)
    requires a manual start

FADEC authority is reduced, therefore closely monitor the start. FADEC does not provide automatic fault correction but does provide ECAM alerts.
ENG MASTER OFF= Fuel LP and HP valves close, Engine start valve closes, ignition stops, FADEC resets.

After ENG MASTER set to ON, switching off ENG MAN START p/b does nothing.

Max motoring speed= N2 acceleration less than 0.2% in 3 secs).

57

Q

ENG – REVERSER UNLOCKED (CLIMB OR APPROACH)

EA/RR – ENGINE FAILURES: REV
UNLOCKED ENG 2 (3)
If in CLIMB: Activate anytime in climb above FL200 or in cruise
If on APPROACH: Activate 20 track-miles from landing airport

ECAM warning but no buffet or vibrations, therefore IDLE could be
maintained

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) System knowledge
  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (M) Assess options available
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (D) Continue, Return, Divert

  • BTV should still be available
  • On landing, selection of REV THR on all THR LVRs is the correct technique
    and REV THR on the affected engine operates normally
  • After landing ECAM will call for the affected ENG MASTER to OFF

Unless buffet is felt, do not shut down the engine. Set Thrust Lever to idle even when idle has automatically been set by the FADEC.

Remember to consider that fuel predictions will not be accurate.

Communication with MCC and VPNC, as well as advice the Purser and PA to put them at ease as they may feel the vibration.

58

Q

ENG (RR ONLY) FADEC FAULT: ALTN MODE

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of FADEC fault (RR).
  • (SA) Application of limitations, performance considerations due to ALTN
    mode.

  • In ALTN mode, the N1 parameter is the primary engine parameter. However
    the THR parameter remains displayed on the EWD.
  • In ALTN mode the TPR (Turbofan Power Ratio) control loop is lost. The
    FADEC computes the N1 command as a function of the thrust levers
    position, speed/Mach, altitude and temperature.
  • An automatic reversion to ALTN mode occurs when some engine
    parameters are not available and also when the P30 or EGT engine
    parameter is failed.
  • When the FADEC is in ALTN mode:
    – The A/THR remains available.
    – The thrust rating modes and the corresponding thrust rating limit are
    available, except flexible and de-rated take-off modes.
    – The maximum available thrust at take-off and go-around is reduced.
    – The maximum available thrust is reduced by 4%.
    – The soft go-around thrust is available.

The ECAM is called ENG X NORM MODE FAULT. It asks to put ALTN mode on all remaining engines to ease on thrust setting.

Limitations are the reduction in TOGA thrust of 4%.

If on ground, there are a lot of considerations in the MEL, including weight penalties, additional 5.5% to the nominal fuel, time and distance to climb, etc.

If in flight, consider penalties for the Approach/Climb gradient due to the thrust reduction.

59

Q

ENG – STALL (AT THR LVR CLB)

EA/RR – ENGINE FAILURES – ENG X STALL
ARM AFTER Take-off; preselect criteria (Thrust Levers Climb)

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (P) ECAM actions
  • (D) Return, continue, divert
  • (C) Communication with MCC and PA for passengers

  • As soon as thrust lever of ENG X is reduced and actual N1 is lower than
    (60% EA), (50% RR) Stall effects disappear
  • As soon as the stalls have ended:
    PURSER (calls the co*ckpit): “Captain, a number of the crew and
    passengers have heard a loud bang which appeared to come from the
    left hand engines.”
  • If MCC is contacted; state no exceedance of EGT and N1 have been
    uplinked
  • The effects should reoccur when thrust lever is increased and N1 is greater
    than (70% EA), (60% RR)
  • The FMS fuel predictions will not be reliable

Procedure for Engine stall:

-Thrust lever (affected) idle

-Engine Anti-ice ON

-if abnormal parameters, Eng Master OFF

-If NORMAL parameters, increase thrust slowly.

It is better to keep the engine running at low power or idle if running smooth than to shut it down, even if an increase in thrust affects the parameters again.

DO REMEMBER TO CONTACT MCC, advise the Purser, and make a PA in a timely manner.

60

Q

ENG – TAILPIPE FIRE (AFTER SHUTDOWN)

After engine shutdown (or ground/cabin crew) reports: “We can see fire
at engine X”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (S) Difference between ENG Fire and Tailpipe Fire
  • (K) Use of ABN NOT SENSED PROC
  • (L) Clear orders to groundcrew

  • ABN NOT-SENSED ENG TAIL PIPE FIRE to be activated by crew
  • Once above procedure complete, Fire is out

Take it slow, advice ATC and Engineer right away, PA “This is the captain ATTENTION CREW AT STATIONS”.

Contact ATC and engineer for further information. If fire is observed only in the rear, recall ABN PROC, ENG, TAIL PIPE FIRE and execute.

If fire seen, but no engine fire ECAM activates automatically, more likely to be a tailpipe fire.

Ask open ended questions (What do you see?) instead of close ended ones. Keep communication with Ground/Cabin Crew clear.

61

Q

F/CTL – EFCS CAPT SIDE STICK INOP

FLIGHT CONTROLS – EFCS: SIDESTICK
FAULT L
Activate as soon as AP ON after T/O

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Decision on the most suitable airport under given conditions
  • (P) Task sharing during CAT 2/3 approaches

  • OM-A FO landing limitations to be considered
  • Although Autoland is still available, CM2 is the only one who can take over
    manual control if needed. Consideration for the task sharing during CAT 2/
    3 should be given

Landing Limitations for FO:

OM-A 5.2.18.2

May not conduct the take-off if:
-Contaminated
-Xwind > 20kts
-Vis -< 500m
-Dep is CATB** or CATC

May not conduct the landing if:
-App is CAT2/3
-Contaminated
-Xwind >20kts
-CAT1 or GLS with AUTOLAND
-Dest is CATB** or CATC
-Non-normal/abnormal condition

If autoland is needed, make careful consideration of the fact that only CM2 may take control if needed and brief accordingly.

62

Q

F/CTL – FLAPS LOCKED (TAKE-OFF/APPROACH)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – SLATS & FLAPS –
FLAPS LOCKED (WTB)

IF ON T/O: ARM after take-off flaps are set, preselect criteria FLAP LEVER 0

IF ON APP: ARM before approach, preselect criteria FLAP LEVER FULL

(DoD 2/3)

A

  • (K) System knowledge
  • (P) ECAM manegement
  • (M) Plan ahead and assess all options available
  • (D) Continue to Destination or Alternate? G/A if on approach
  • (H) More demanding landing technique if limited flaps are available (after T/O)

  • Vls, Vmo, V􀄮prot, V􀄮max speeds shown are correct
  • No computer reset available as the WTB have locked the FLAPS
  • FMS Fuel predictions not to be used
  • Flaps might change position when a REPOS is required but Flaps remain
    locked. Use Emirates Custom Repositions and check actual Flap position
    before release
  • Potential threat is a tail-strike if limited flaps (i.e. Flaps < 2)
  • If event used on approach, a go-around is likely to be flown
  • Landing capability CAT 1, except if Flaps already at 3 or more

As soon as FLAPS LOCK, pull selected Speed to avoid overspeeding or underspeeding.

Once locked, WTB cannot be unlocked in flight.

Flap Load Relief System (FLRS), Autoretraction system (ARS) and Auto Extension System (AES) are lost.

Cruise baulk and alpha-lock are available.

VFE NEXT-5 to configure and decelerate.

Use FLAP 3, and LDPA should include the failure with the proper FLAP setting, check VAPP to mitigate the possibility of a tailstrike.

The VFE, VFE NEXT and VLS on the PFD are for the actual flap position.

For CONF1+F or less, fuel consumption may increase by up to 40%.

Because of reduced drag, consider slower deceleration and request a longer final if possible, or configure in advance.

NO AUTOLAND.
CAT1 Approach

Consider moderate icing, as flight in icing conditions is not permitted!

For G/A, keep config

Alternate Law - Protections lost

If slats/flaps are stuck at zero (less likely), the continue decision makes more sense, if they’re stuck at intermediate positions it may be impossible to make it to destination. Also, the the 20000’ limitation for Slats/Flaps limits the flight.

Consider the landing distance will be considerably longer, make sure the VApp is correct, fuel penalty will apply in all cases except slats stuck at zero (refer to FCOM procedure), approach capability will be downgraded.

63

Q

F/CTL – PRIM 1 FAULT ON LDG (BTV REVERTS HI)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – EFCS – PRIM 1 FAULT
Arm before landing, preselect criteria Speed VAPP -10 kts

DoD 1

A

  • (D) Startle effect
  • (S) Possible de-activation of A/B HI when landing distance allows

  • Only use this event, if BTV is planned and used
  • Preferably not to be used on a wet runway
  • FMA displays Autobrake HI after fault is triggered

The BTV system uses information from:
-on board airport navigation system OANS
-airport navigation display on ND
-auto flight system (PRIM)
-braking system
-flight warning system
-display system
-landing runway selected on fms

ROW/ROP
Lost if:
-aircraft position is erroneous
-data inconsistency in airport navigation database
-landing runway is not known by the system

Beware that keeping autobrake at HI will severely heat up the brakes.

Once runway is vacated, and considering the brake temperature, ANC (let ATC know you’re not going to continue taxiing yet) and perform ECAM actions. May be able to regain the PRIM, and if not, after selecting FLAPS 0, it will ask to select FLAPS 1 to avoid damage.

64

Q

F/CTL – RUDDER PEDAL FAULT

FLIGHT CONTROLS – EFCS – RUDDER
PEDAL FAULT
Activate anytime after take-off when AP ON

(DoD 3)

A

  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (M) Workload Management
  • (D) Continue or divert
  • (A) Use of automation, possible manual approach

  • This warning is caused by a fault in the Pedal Feel Trim Unit and all pedal
    transducers. The rudder pedals have no further effect in flight or on the
    ground
  • When the differential braking is greater than 50%, the PRIMs order a rudder
    deflection, in addition to the rudder pedal order. The differential braking
    rudder deflection order is limited when the rudder pedals are not at 0°.
  • This event should not be used in conditions which preclude an autoland.
    Manual landing in a crosswind >10 kts may to lead to runway excursion
    without sound differential braking technique.
  • An ECAM warning is triggered. The AP should be left ON as the rudder is
    controlled normally by the AP. Yaw Damping and Turn Coordination
    remains available
  • An AUTOLAND is recommended but is not a mandatory requirement and if
    required for operational reasons a manual landing can be conducted
  • A/BRK should not be used and instead differential braking is to be used for
    directional control. BTV is not available
  • NWS control via the rudder pedals is lost, but is available through the tiller
    below 70 kts. Above 70 kts the steering during the landing roll is achieved
    by the ROLLOUT mode of the AP and by differential braking
  • LDG DIST/PERF is affected due to the use of differential braking
  • When the differential braking is greater than 50%, the PRIMs order a rudder
    deflection, in addition to the rudder pedal order. The differential braking
    rudder deflection order is limited when the rudder pedals are not at 0 °.

When AP is not engaged:
-Pedals easy to move but do not command the rudders
-The manual rudder trim is lost
-Yaw damping and turn coordination remain available

Pay special consideration to any crosswind reported, and in case of AUTOLAND, consider the autoland limitations (HW38, TW15, XW30)

65

Q

F/CTL – SEC 2 FAULT (NON-RESETTABLE)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – EFCS – SEC 2
FAULT
Activate anytime above 1000 ft in climb or cruise

(DoD 1)

A

  • ECAM F/CTL SEC 2 FAULT
  • Computer reset is not successful
  • 2 pairs of Spoilers INOP, LANDING DIST AFFECTED
  • BTV is not available

The ECAM actions request to reset the SEC 2 accordingly. If unsuccessful, then it asks to turn it off.

Landing distance is affected and BTV is lost due to the loss of ground-spoilers 2 and 7.

After landing set flaps lever to CONF 1+F.

After shutdown, retract the Flaps.

66

Q

F/CTL – SLATS LOCKED (ON TAKE-OFF)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – SLATS & FLAPS –
SLATS LOCKED (WTB)

Fault will trigger as soon as lever is set to 0

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) ECAM handling and LDPA calculation
  • (D) Return/Divert decision
  • (K) Use of the Fuel Penalty Factor
  • (H) More demanding landing technique

  • FMS Fuel predictions not to be used
  • LDPA to determine LDG DIST and Vapp (speed increase to avoid tail strike)
  • If REPOS use Emirates Custom Repositions and check actual Flap position
  • Potential threat is landing on the nose-gear
  • Landing capability CAT 1

Before anything, protect the ANCs. Make sure you select an appropriate speed, more track miles, and then call for ECAM actions. Once ECAM actions are complete and Status page is reached, perform an ACE and perform a computer reset. Remember to only attempt to reset one computer at a time. If only one SLAT SYS is recovered, SLATS will be slow, and capability is reduced to CAT 3 SINGLE.
In this case the reset is not possible since they are LOCKED.

If slats/flaps are stuck at zero (less likely), the continue decision makes more sense, if they’re stuck at intermediate positions it may be impossible to make it to destination. Also, the 20000’ limitation for Slats/Flaps limits the flight.

Consider the landing distance will be considerably longer, make sure the VApp is correct, fuel penalty will apply in all cases except slats stuck at zero (refer to FCOM procedure), approach capability will be downgraded.

67

Q

F/CTL – SLATS SYS 1+2 FAULT (RESETTABLE)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – SLATS SYSTEM
FAULT 1+2

At 12 NM ATC: “Reduce to minimum speed”
Once SLAT 1 or 2 is reset, Clear SLAT SYSTEM 1 FAULT

(DoD 2)

A

  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (K) Applying correct FCOM Flaps recycle procedure

  • If ECAM displays FLAP LEVER RECYCLE, reset lever to 0 and then
    immediately to the position where the failure occurred. Line might not
    appear in the simulator
  • Computer reset of SLATS 1 and 2. If not attempted, fault remains
  • Crew might decide to G/A or stop the APP, depending when Flap 3 is
    selected

Before anything, protect the ANCs. Make sure you select an appropriate speed, more track miles, and then call for ECAM actions. Once ECAM actions are complete and Status page is reached, perform an ACE and perform a computer reset. Remember to only attempt to reset one computer at a time. If only one SLAT SYS is recovered, SLATS will be slow, and capability is reduced to CAT 3 SINGLE.

FOR RECYCLING, SET THE FLAPS LEVER TO 0. THEN, IMMEDIATELY SET THE FLAPS TO THE POSITION AT THE TIME THE FAILURE OCCURRED.
IN THE CASE OF HIGH FRICTION OR A JAM (E.G. ICE ACCRETION), THE MOVEMENT OF THE SLATS IS AUTOMATICALLY STOPPED TO PREVENT OVERLOAD. RECYCLING THE FLAPS LEVER RESTORES THE MOVEMENT OF THE SLATS IF THE REASON FOR THE OVERLOAD IS NO LONGER PRESENT.

68

Q

F/CTL – SPEED BRAKES FAULT AFTER ARMING (BEFORE TAKE-OFF)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – SURFACES – SPEED BRAKES FAULT
After the flight crew arms the speed brake before take-off

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) ECAM actions during LVO taxi
  • (P) ECAM actions, MEL application
  • (K) Flight Controls
  • (S) Flight path

  • Flight computers detect a loss of SPD BRKs function
  • There is no more extension of speed brakes
  • The ground spoilers will extend when the reversers are deployed
  • MEL/MEL Items/Preamble/FAILURES PRIOR TO TAKEOFF
  • T.O memo on the EWD will display SPLRs… ARM in blue
  • TOPA consideration (MEL WITH NO PERFORMANCE IMPACT)
  • HOT consideration if de-iced

Under the MEL, this fault is contemplated under 27-64-04. It is C interval, 0 required, and the operational procedure says that the ground spoilers are not armed but extend automatically at reverser selection. Disregard blue spoiler arm lines in T.O. and Landing Memos.

Unfortunately there is no reset or fix for this fault. As always, communicate with the company and seek advice from maintenance if possible.

When the MEL item is ticked, the TOPA will say it has no performance impact! That is because the ground spoilers will extend upon reverse selection.

Be mindful of the Holdover Time limits!!!

The reason it is recommended not to use with FUEL LEAK is because under fuel leak the use of reversers is not recommended, which would mean the spoilers would NOT extend after landing.

69

Q

F/CTL – SPEED BRAKES FAULT (AFTER TAKE-OFF)

FLIGHT CONTROLS – SURFACES –
SPEED BRAKES FAULT
Activate when Speed Brakes are disarmed after T/O

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (H) Handling, considers the implications for landing procedures

  • Flight computers detect a loss of SPD BRKs function
  • There is no more extension of speed brakes
  • The ground spoilers will extend when the reversers are deployed
  • TOPA consideration (MEL WITH NO PERFORMANCE IMPACT)

Under the MEL, this fault is contemplated under 27-64-04. It is C interval, 0 required, and the operational procedure says that the ground spoilers are not armed but extend automatically at reverser selection. Disregard blue spoiler arm lines in T.O. and Landing Memos.

Unfortunately there is no reset or fix for this fault. As always, communicate with the company and seek advice from maintenance if possible.

When the MEL item is ticked, the TOPA will say it has no performance impact! That is because the ground spoilers will extend upon reverse selection.

Roll rate may be reduced at low speeds.

70

Q

FIRE: MLG-WHEEL WELL FIRE – AFTER TO

MLG BAY FIRE
Activate shortly after gear retraction after take-off

(DoD 4)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of Fire and Smoke Protection: MLG Bay Fire.
  • (C) Effective communication with other CM, ATC, Purser, Pax, Emergency
    Services to coordinate safe outcome.
  • (D) Decision to expedite LAND ASAP and/or EMER EVAC.

  • Use the EK Custom Faults as this fault will cause excessive brake temp on
    2 wheels (the chapter 26 fault doesn’t give this).
  • The alert(s) trigger, when the loops detect either a fire, or a fault in the main
    landing gear bay with the following conditions:
    – Both loops A and B have detected a fire, or
    – One loop has detected a fire, or
    – Both loops are failed within 5 s.
  • Inflight procedure requires LAND ASAP and L/G: KEEP DOWN.
  • Ground procedure may require EMER EVAC.

This is an obvious time critical scenario.

Protect the ANCs. Once that is done, if warning is still valid, consider requesting vectors back to the field under Mayday and to have emergency services dispatched and ready as we have a wheel well fire, activating secondary, if overweight activate or action the overweight landing checklist. Do NOT rush but do not delay returning to the field.

“This is the captain attention crew at stations,” and perhaps quickly through a PA advise passengers we will be landing back due to a technical failure in X minutes, please follow directions of the cabin crew.

Upon landing, bring aircraft to a stop. Use cameras, wheel page to assess situation, as well communicate with ATC and fire services. Use VHF1 as the other VHFs will stop working once power is cutoff through engine and APU fire PB.

If EVAC required, confirm if fire is still there or if it was put out by fire services. If out, you will require a tow back, if continues, consider evacuation.

71

Q

FUEL: FEED TANK 1 MAIN PUMP FAULT

FUEL: FEED TK 1 MAIN PUMP FAULT
Activate During taxi out i.e. after dispatch

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Knowledge of fuel system, MEL and Operational application of
    Performance penalties due to gravity ceiling and tank imbalance.
  • (C) Liaise with other CM and Engineering.
  • (D) Decision on endurance capabilities given Operational restrictions.
  • (WLM) Monitoring the operation of a degraded fuel system.

  • This fault may be caused by actual pump failure or abnormal low pressure
    or inflight the case of failure of the AC 2 busbar (ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT
    alert) both feed tank 1 pumps and both outer tanks pump are lost.
  • MEL guidance for failures prior to takeoff should be followed.
  • The MEL Ops Proc 28-26-06A Feed Tank 1 Main Pump is detailed and
    needs to be accurately followed.
  • Feed tank 1 feeds engine 1 by gravity only. Outer tank transfer is by gravity
    only. Management of feed tank 1 imbalance is lost and also cannot be cross
    fed to other engines. Fuel consumption is increased (due to altitude
    limitation set by gravity feed ceiling and feed tanks imbalance) FMS
    predictions are unreliable.
  • To mitigate the above operational constraints, an anticipated recovery of the
    outer tank fuel is required.

This is quite a complex MEL with a very simple ECAM.

The MEL operational procedure is extensive, requiring the testing of all stdby fuel pumps during co*ckpit preparation, the xfeed valves after refuelling, and then passing FL300 and under 500T to stop xfer from INNERS and MID tanks until the affected feed tank and its opposite feed tank are both under 16 tons, when the outer fuel is xferred to the outer feedtanks. After the xfer is complete, then we can use the INNERS and MIDS again, which will balance the feeds through normal xfers.

If normal xfers are not working, then an FQMS (one at a time) has to be performed (Supp proc).

The way the supporting notes are written is misleading, as the 4th point is only if we have AC BUS 2 Fault.

If AC bus 2 fault happens during the outer xfer, divert because fuel will be trapped in the feed tank. In that case, follow the MEL Ops procedure carefully as it asks for certain actions to be ignored or delayed.

72

Q

FUEL – FQMS 1+2 FAULT (FQMS 2 RECOVERABLE)

FUEL TANKS – FQDC FAULT 2 Anytime after take-off

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) Protecting ANC
  • (P) ECAM actions, Computer Reset
  • (K) Fuel System

  • Initially ECAM will trigger FUEL FQDC 2 FAULT
  • After the FQDC 1 fault, the ECAM will trigger FUEL FQMS 1+2 FAULT and
    FUEL FQI FAULT
  • FQMS 1+ 2 (ONE BY ONE)…RESET is not successful, and the alert will
    persist
  • After FQMS 1 RESET…PULL (leaving FQMS 1 reset pulled), clear FQDC 2
    fault

FQDC2 fault will initially trigger an ECAM. With only system 2 failed, the only indication apart from the ECAM will be the loss of temperature indications for the right wing tanks.

After the second fault, the FQMS1+2 fault will come up, asking you for a reset. Reset one at a time and one by one. Disregard the MFD message to reenter the ZFW/ZFWCG.

Wait 1 minute after the reset. If the alert persists, PULL FQMS1. If that works, leave the reset pulled

The reset procedure is similar to the CIDS reset procedure. Leave the CB pulled if that works.

73

Q

FUEL – OUTER XFR FAULT

FUEL SYSTEM – OUTR TANK XFR FAULT L
Activate just before take-off

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Return/divert/continue
  • (K) Fuel system knowledge
  • (P) ECAM handling

  • Malfunction simulates failure of both the automatic transfer pump and all
    valves
  • If fuel is less than 50 T, Fault might only trigger when within 28 min of
    destination apt
  • Malfunction will trigger following ECAMS; L OUTR TK PUMP FAULT,
    NORM+ALTN
  • ECAM will request FQMS 1+2 (one by one) Reset. Do NOT clear
    malfunction
  • OUTR TK FUEL should remain available

The fuel remains useable. An imbalance may occur since the outer xfers more fuel to feed tanks 1 and 4 than 2 and 3. Also, to xfer all of the fuel may take up to 1 hour.

During this xfer, all other normal xfers may be inhibitted, and are recovered when the Emerg Outr xfer is set back to auto.

Consider balancing the fuel depending on how long until destination.

74

Q

FUEL – TRIM TK L+R PUMPS FAULT

FUEL SYSTEM – TRIM TANK PUMP FAULT
– L
Preset passing FL100
IOS MALFUNCTION – ATA 28 FUEL SYSTEM – TRIM TANK PUMP FAULT
– R
Preset passing FL120
(Each Malfunction takes 5 mins to activate after being triggered)

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Knowledge
  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (M) Workload Management
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (D) Continue, Return or Divert?

  • Do not use this event if no fuel in TRIM TK at dispatch
  • The first TRIM TANK PUMP FAULT is a simple ECAM requiring a switching
    action
  • The second TRIM TK PUMP FAULT is more complicated as it results in up
    to 2.3 T of fuel remaining unuseable in the TRIM TK. Gravity feed of the
    useable fuel will occur only in cruise when pitch attitude < 3°
  • Crew are to conduct ECAM actions to switch TRIM TK pumps OFF and will
    need to consider whether the flight can be continued if some of the fuel is
    unuseable

(Event ends when the crew have made a decision to continue the flight)

Gravity transfer occurs at approximately 3000 kg/h

Consider the effect of the unusable fuel on CG (aft), generally it will give a lower fuel consumption, slower stall speed, less stability but more manoeuvrability, but it also puts some additional stress on the tail at landing.

75

Q

HYD – (G) SYS LEAK AFTER LANDING

HYDRAULIC – RSVR LOW LEVEL (FLUID
QTY DEC) – YELLOW – 8LTR
Activate only after the ATC smoke call has been reported

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) Difference between smoke and fire
  • (C) Good communication with Fire Services, ATC, Cabin Crew and Pax
  • (D) Using time available to collect more info

  • Only use this event during day and if visibility allows ATC to visually see the
    aircraft
  • At the end of the landing roll out, ATC reports: “We can see smoke coming
    from your main landing gear – do you need any assistance?”
  • Leak is at a fixed 15 L/sec; loosing 92 L (100 L-8 L) takes about 6 sec
  • Expectation for the crew is to make an “Attention crew at stations” call
  • After 3 min, Fire Services are available to do an inspection of the landing
    gear. Fire Services: “We can see white smoke, from your Left landing gear
    and fluid on the ground. No fire for the moment, can you shut down your left
    engines?”
  • Once engines are shut down, Fire Services: “Do you want us to cool down
    the brakes by spraying?”. Depending on the brake temperatures and if fluid
    is still leaking on the brakes, this might be the preferred option

76

Q

HYD (G) LEAK DURING TAKE-OFF ROLL REF

HYDRAULIC - RSVR LO LEVEL – G
ARM BEFORE Take-off, QTY 0, preselect criteria IAS V1 KTS

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) ECAM actions and FPF calculation
  • (D) Return/Continue/Divert decision
  • (K) Limitations
  • (S) Awareness of increased fuel consumption with gear down (after G/A)
    and effect on ALTN, FINAL RSV fuel

  • Only the BLG will retract
  • Gravity Gear Extension, FLAPS/SLATS SLOW but operational, Normal
    brakes including auto-brakes; Main factor for LDPA is 3 pair of spoilers inop
  • Steer Endurance limited; if no APU available considerations of leaving two
    engines running during towing, especially night time. Allow sufficient time
    after landing for the LOS/LOE to come to an end
  • Landing capability is CAT 3 SINGLE

F/Ctls are still actuated, EHA and EBHA.

Flaps operate at normal speed, but Slats will be slow at half-speed.

The wing Landing gear will NOT retract. To extend the Landing gear again Gravity extension will be needed.

There is also a DU that says to REDUCE the MACH to 0.83 in case of a hydraulic system failure to avoid control surface oscillation due to likely failed defective seals.

In any case, speed will be limited to 250ias/MACH 0.55 due to the Landing gear being partially extended (WLG). Also, remember Maximum Altitude at which the landing gear can be extended is 21000 feet.

To avoid overspeed, use Open Climb and Open Descent, as well as selected speed.

To avoid damage to the pumps, turn off and disconnect Green engine pumps as per ECAM. After landing, ECAM will ask to also turn off the electrical Green pumps after engine shutdown.

Landing distance is affected due loss of 3 spoilers per wing. Also, BTV will not be available.

Normal steering is not available, ALTN NWS is available. This allows to vacate the runway but anticipate towing to the gate after vacating to avoid overheating the NWS. Steering will be slow. Damping of tillers are increased.

FMS predictions will be unreliable due to the gear being partially extended.

Fuel consumption may increase by up to 20%.

Make sure to coordinate with VPNC as to which airport would work better for maintenance reasons, also consider the weather and runway conditions due to the failure of the ground spoilers.

The runway will have to be inspected after take-off so let ATC know right away. Coordinate a tug to tow us after landing. Consider a quick inspection from fire services to make sure that no hydraulic liquid is smoking or catching fire. During NITS tell Purser we will not be able to taxi to the gate. Reassure passengers through PA but advise them to remain seated as for safety we will have an inspection before being towed to the gate.

77

Q

HYD – (G) SYS OVERHEAT

HYDRAULIC – SYSTEM OVERHEAT
Above 5000’ – GREEN

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (D) Continue, Return or Divert?
  • (M) Workload Management

  • This warning can be caused by either the reservoir temperature exceeding
    94°C, or one of the ENG PUMP A+B case drain temperatures exceeding
    120°C
  • If the overheat warning disappears and the crew reselect the HYD PMPs
    ON, the OVHT warning will trigger again
  • Gravity Gear Extension, FLAPS/SLATS SLOW but operational, Normal
    brakes including auto-brakes; Main factor for LDPA is 3 pair of spoilers inop
  • Steer Endurance limited; if no APU available considerations of leaving two
    engines running during towing, especially night time
  • Allow sufficient time after landing for the LOS/LOE to come to an end
  • Landing capability is CAT 3 SINGLE

Due to the failure of some spoiler, maintain config 1+F after landing to avoid damage.

Also check if an aileron has failed (Check FCOM DU)

Normal nose wheel steering (NWS) is lost. ALTN NWS is available.
The ALTN NWS is designed to be used until the runway is cleared (i.e. to land and to exit the runway). Therefore, the flight crew should anticipate the use of a tug to tow the aircraft to the gate.
The flight crew should avoid a prolonged use of the ALTN NWS because it would result in an ALTN NWS overheat and a disconnection of the NWS.
In alternate nose wheel steering:
The maximum steering rate is limited to 10 °/s (instead of 15 °/s for normal NWS)
Damping of the CAPT and the F/O tillers is increased to prevent the flight crew from commanding excessive steering rates.

78

Q

HYD (Y) LEAK DURING TAKE-OFF ROLL

HYDRAULIC – Y RSVR LOW LEVEL
ARM BEFORE Take-off, QTY 0, preselect criteria IAS V1 KTS

(DoD 3)

A

  • (P) ECAM actions and FPF calculation.
  • (D) Return/Continue/Divert decision
  • (K) Limitations
  • (S) Awareness of increased fuel consumption with gear down (after G/A)
    and effect on ALTN, FINAL RSV fuel

  • Only the NLG will retract
  • Gravity Gear Extension, FLAPS SLOW, Body Wheel steering is lost
  • If no APU available considerations of leaving two engines running during
    towing, especially night time. Allow sufficient time after landing for the LOS/
    LOE to come to an end
  • Landing capability is CAT 3 SINGLE
  • Use Emirates Custom REPOS, if repositioning to a different airport

F/Ctls are still actuated, EHA and EBHA.

Slats operate at normal speed, but Flaps will be slow at half-speed.

The Body Landing and Wing Landing gear will NOT retract. To extend the Landing gear again Gravity extension will be needed.

There is also a DU that says to REDUCE the MACH to 0.83 in case of a hydraulic system failure to avoid control surface oscillation due to likely failed defective seals.

In any case, speed will be limited to 250ias/MACH 0.55 due to the Landing gear being partially extended (WLG+BLG). Also, remember Maximum Altitude at which the landing gear can be extended is 21000 feet.

To avoid overspeed, use Open Climb and Open Descent, as well as selected speed.

To avoid damage to the pumps, turn off and disconnect engine pumps as per ECAM. After landing, ECAM may ask to also turn off the electrical pumps after engine shutdown.

Landing distance is affected due loss of some spoilers per wing. Also, BTV will not be available.

BLG steering is not available. Consider towing to the gate after vacating.

FMS predictions will be unreliable due to the gear being partially extended.

Fuel consumption may increase significantly, check FCOM.

Make sure to coordinate with VPNC as to which airport would work better for maintenance reasons, also consider the weather and runway conditions due to the failure of the ground spoilers.

The runway will have to be inspected after take-off so let ATC know right away. Coordinate a tug to tow us after landing. Consider a quick inspection from fire services to make sure that no hydraulic liquid is smoking or catching fire. During NITS tell Purser we will not be able to taxi to the gate. Reassure passengers through PA but advise them to remain seated as for safety we will have an inspection before being towed to the gate.

79

Q

L/G – DOORS NOT CLOSED (AT GEAR RETRACTION)

LANDING GEAR: DOORS NOT CLOSED, R
WLG

ARM BEFORE Take-off, NO preselect criteria needed

  • ECAM will trigger after 40 s for a retraction and 60 s for an extension

(DoD 2)

A

  • (P) ECAM actions
  • (D) Possible diversion or return due to increased fuel burn
  • (K) Use of the Fuel Penalty Factor

  • SD displays WHEEL page affected doors position indication is displayed in
    amber
  • Altitude and Range are limited
  • FMS Fuel predictions to be disregarded (drag of landing gear doors)
  • Use Emirates Custom REPOS, if repositioning to a different airport

MAX SPEED is 250 Kias or 0.55M.

Attempt a recycle by following the ECAM.

The recycle is to select the landing gear DOWN (UP), wait for the DOWNLOCK (UPLOCK), then select the landing gear UP again. The active LGCIS changes. Recycle one time only.

During the flight, DO NOT USE MANAGED SPEED, CLB or DES modes… selected speed, open climb and open descent are ok.

Fuel Consumption with all doors open can increase up to 10%. A quick way to measure whether we can make the selected airport is to put it in the FMS (consider using SEC FPLN), with the correct speed and altitude limitations for the failure, and then checking the Trip Fuel (and altn fuel) and multiplying it by the given fuel penalty.

80

Q

L/G – NOT LOCKED DOWN (GRAVITY EXTENSION POSSIBLE)

LANDING GEAR: L/G NOT LOCKED DOWN
L WLG

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of landing gear
  • (P) ECAM Handling
  • (S) Extra fuel burn with L/G down

  • As L WLG is not down, both BLG will remain up as well
  • Gravity Gear Extension requires extra time, which might lead to a G/A

The ECAM requests the crew to recycle the landing gear, which should take at least 60 seconds, it is preferable to discontinue the approach and sort out the problem if fuel permits.

The landing gear gravity extension takes approximately 70 seconds.

81

Q

LVOPS – DUAL RA FAULT

RADIO – RA SYS FAULT preset to 300’ radio
altitude – RA (A) and RA (B)
ARM Preselect criteria 300’RA on approach

(DoD 1)

A

  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight
  • (M) Correct assessment of options available
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around

  • ECAM caution RA SYS A+B FAULT
  • Landing capability CAT 2
  • When asked, ATC will advise that weather conditions are currently RVR
    300/250/200
  • Only use this event in LVO

RVR may be reduced from 350 to 300 if CATII autoland is to be performed. (OM-A 8.1.4.3.2.2)

In any case, if any doubt exists it is better to cancel the approach, re-assess the landing capability, and then make a more educated decision.

82

Q

LVOPS – GLIDESLOPE FAIL

RADIO-NAVIGATION – ILS G/S
TRANSMITTER FAULT – ARM Preselect criteria 300’RA on approach

(DoD 1)

A

  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight
  • (M) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (S) Situational Awareness

  • Fault will cause the GS indices on the PFD to disappear and the FD bars to
    flash
  • ATC advise that their ILS monitoring systems have confirmed that a
    temporary failure occurred of the glideslope. This has now been rectified
    and the crew can expect priority radar vectors for another ILS approach
  • CLEAR MALFUNCTION when aircraft is on downwind
  • Only use this event in LVO

(Event remains till end of go-around)

If the receiver fails, a red G/S flag will appear on the corresponding failed receiver’s display (PFD and ND in rose LS). If the transmitter fails, the diamond disappears (or half diamond if full deflection).

If both ILS receivers fail, the autopilot will also disengage if loc is either armed or engaged. Triple click and FD bars flash.

83

Q

LVOPS – GYROMETER FAULT

FLIGHT CONTROLS – EFCS – 1
GYROMETER FAULT
ARM Preselect criteria 500’RA on approach

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (P) Application of Procedures

  • Fault triggers: AUTOFLIGHT APPROACH CAPABILITY DOWNGRADED
  • Only use this event in LVO
  • Landing capability CAT 3 single

84

Q

LVOPS – IR 1 FAIL

IR1 FAULT
ARM Preselect criteria 300’RA on approach

  • Fault will cause loss of the CAPTs attitude and heading with red ATT and
    HDG flags and loss of HDG and MAP information on the CAPTs ND

(DoD 1)

A

  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight
  • (M) Good assessment of options available
  • (S) Situational Awareness

  • When asked, ATC will advise weather conditions are RVR 300/250/200 and
    that the crew can expect priority radar vectors for another ILS approach
  • Landing capability CAT 3 single

Transfer Controls to CM2 if CM1 is flying. A Go-Around should be performed.

use ATT HDG SWTG as per ECAM to recover PFD on PF side.

IF IR1 fails, TCAS, WXR, TERR SYS, ADS-B RPTG 1, etc must switch over to IR2, and viceversa.

85

Q

LVOPS – ISIS FAULT (ON APPROACH)

ISIS FAULT
– ISIS 1
Passing 1500’RA on final approach

The upper SFD will go blank. The SFD display will be automatically
transferred to the lower ISIS and will be displayed instead of the SND

(DoD 1)

A

  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (M) Plan ahead and assess options available
  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (K) System knowledge

According to FCOM/Limit/22-Autoflight/Automatic…/Requ’d Equipment…/

Attitude indication on standby instrument is REQUIRED for CAT2, CAT3Single, CAT3Dual. It is on the second list, which lists equipment not monitored by the FG. Due to automatic switching, the data should be transferred to the ISIS 2 display, therefore effectively recovering Attitude indication on a standby instrument.

ISIS 2 screen switches automatically to SFD, the altimeter reverts to STD •
Refer to FCOM/Limitations/AFS/REQUIRED EQUIPMENT NOT MONITORED BY THE FG

86

Q

LVOPS – LOC EXCESSIVE DRIFT

LOW VIS OPS/AUTOLAND – LOC BEAM
EXCESS DRIFT
ARM Preselect criteria 300’RA on approach

  • The scenario is that the aircraft ahead is late vacating the runway and
    causes some interference with the LOC beam
  • Passing 1000’RA: “Emirates xxx, the aircraft ahead has advised that he
    has a nose wheel steering problem and will be slow to vacate.
    Continue Approach”
  • Passing 400’RA: “Emirates xxx, the aircraft is just clear of the runway
    at the end, clear to land XX”

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (P) Application of Procedures

  • Below 300’RA the FD bars will show lateral movement and the LOC index
    will begin to move away from center. This should be noticed by the
    monitoring pilot (FO) who may advise the CAPT. By approx. 150’RA the
    LOC index will be outside the allowable tolerance and the AUTOLAND light
    will flash. If the crew persist with the approach and become visual they will
    be significantly offset from the runway centerline

(Event ends when aircraft has performed a G/A)

The loc flashes if the deviation is more than 1/4 dot for more than 2 seconds.

The GS flashes if the deviation is more than 1 dot for more than 2 seconds.

LOC indication will drift. LOC scale will only flash below 1000 ft RA

Once fault is cleared, AP/FD will guide the aircraft back to the LOC but might infringe on the protected area of max 1 dot (half scale deflection)

If in Visual conditions, and caught early, continuing the approach may be safer than performing a GA. Utilize common sense.

Remember to do a PA to communicate to the crew and reassure the passengers.

87

Q

LVOPS – MID RVR NOT AVAILABLE

  • Prior to commencement of the approach procedure, ATC: “Expect ILS
    approach runway XX, for info MID RVR is not available, check your
    minima”

(DoD 1)

A

  • Refer LIDO RAR (EASA)

LIDO 1.4.8.9.2

In case of CAT1, the loss of the MID RVR has no effect.

In case of CAT2, 3A or 3B with DH, if the RWY is equipped with 2 or more RVR, one may be INOP.

In case of CAT3B with NO DH, at least one RVR value is to be available on the aerodrome.

88

Q

LVOPS – NO VISUAL REFERENCE AT MINIMA

Select RVR for approach one category better than
approach flown
(CAT 3A select MIN RVR for CAT 3B, CAT 2 select MIN RVR CAT 3A)

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (K) OM-A and LVO

  • NOT TO BE USED FOR CAT 3B NO DH
  • RVR given to crew is minimum required for the approach being flown
  • After go-around, if crew decides to start second approach, improve RVR to
    minima for approach being flown
  • Refer to OM-A Visual References at DH 8.1.4.3.4(Event remains till after go-around)

“go-around Flaps”
–Thrust to TOGA and back to MCT for GA SOFT
retract flaps 1 step, and call “flap X”
“FMA”
“Positive climb”
“Gear up”

Refer to OM-A Visual References at DH 8.1.4.3.4

Before commencing another approach we must have confirmation that the conditions have improved sufficiently for a safe landing, otherwise consider diverting.

89

Q

LVOPS – AUTO ROLL OUT FAULT

LOW VIS OPS/AUTOLAND – ROLLOUT FAULT
ARM Preselect criteria 2000’RA on approach

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Continue or G/A
  • (P) Possible change of minima
  • (H) Manual directional control after landing in LVO

  • ECAM AUTO FLT ROLL OUT FAULT, FOR AUTOLAND MANUAL ROLL
    OUT ONLY
  • Landing Capability is CAT 3 Single

Time may not be sufficient to complete all the tasks. Consider ECAM Actions, ACE, Status, check minimum required equipment, briefing, change MDA in the FMS. Also, do not neglect the basics such as ANCs, be configured and stable, and complete all pertinent checklists.

It will be heavy workload under a time constraint, so may have to consider discontinuing the approach.

90

Q

LVOPS – RUNWAY CENTERLINE LIGHTS (RCLL) FAIL

  • At 800 ft RA: ATC: “Emirates XXX, Runway centreline lights have just failed.”

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Application of Procedures
  • (K) Downgrade with Failure of ground equipment
  • (P) Continue to land or Go-around

  • If no low fuel status, a G/A should be flown and further clarification in LIDO
    sought. If crew does not perform a G/A, ATC should order a G/A at 300 ft
    due to a temporarily total failure of all lights
  • If landing at a US airport refer Failed or Degraded Equipment table in LIDO
    (CAT 3 NOT ALLOWED, CAT 2 NO EFFECT. Once the table is consulted,
    the RVR will improve to 1200 ft (where the initial RVR was lower) to allow a
    CAT 2 approach
  • If landing at a Canadian airport refer to table LIDO RAR 10.4.7.1 If needed
    increase the RVR to allow a CAT 2/3 approach to be flown
  • Note: Examiner should check before crew starts second approach that
    the actual weather set up on IOS is sufficient to fly the approach
    and conduct the landing. Check RVR and cloud base

91

Q

LVOPS – RUNWAY LIGHTS FAILURE TOTAL (APROACH)

AIRPORT LIGHTING – ALL RWY XX Lights 0
Activate passing 300’RA

(DoD 1 - day /DoD 2 - night)

A

  • Simulates electrical power failure. Power is restored after landing or G/A
  • For startle effect, allow the crew to see the RWY lights before switching
    them off
  • Crew might have sufficient visual reference to complete the landing using
    the aircraft landing lights
  • Using the event in NIGHT/DUSK will lead to a G/A

According to LIDO-RAR-8.9, if REDL, THRL or RENL are failed, night approaches may not be flown CAT3A or CAT3B. In the US, CAT 3 without them is not allowed either.

There is no effect on the minima during daytime.

92

Q

LVOPS – RVR BELOW MIN REQUIRED AFTER APPROACH BAN POINT (ABP)

  • After ATC landing clearance has been given, at 900 ft RA; ATC: “RVR is
    xxx, please check your minima”

(DoD 1)

A

  • RVR at touchdown point is 100m below minimums, other RVR’s at minima
  • Refer to OM-A 8.3.0.8.6 for ABP

(Event remains till end of go-around)

Passed ABP the approach may be continued down to minimums, if appropriate visual references sighted at Mins, continue with landing, if CAT3B with no DH, landing. If visual references not sighted at minimums, execute a go-around.

93

Q

LVOPS – RVR DURING CAT 2 APP

  • With low visibility procedures in force, before starting the approach, ATC
    states: “CAT 2 ONLY in force due to airport equipment”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) OM-A and LVO

  • When requested, ATC: “RVR’s are 350/150/150”
  • As CCI and ILS chart does not provide the required minima for CAT 2 MID
    and ROLL OUT RVR, Refer to OM-A 8.1.4.3.2(Event remains till end of Flt)

Be aware, this is under FLIGHT PREPARATION, AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA, and not in the All weather Ops section of chapter 8.

For a CAT2 approach:
TDZ=350 MID=125RO=Advisory

For a CAT3A
TDZ=200MID=125RO=Advisory

For a CAT3B
TDZ=75MID=75RO=Advisory

*FOR RO, Not below 75m. If landing distance says stop end of runway is required, the RO becomes controlling.

*CAT2 with autoland, TDZ may be reduced to 300m if LIDO IAC reflects aerodrom capable of doing so.

*Landing can be performed with TDZ+RO controlling (except for US operations).

94

Q

LVOPS – SIDE SLIP ANGLE PROBE HEATING FAULT

SIDE SLIP PROBE HEATING FAULT – ADR 2
ARM Preselect criteria 800’RA on approach

  • Landing capability downgrade to CAT 3 SINGLE

(DoD 1)

A

Consider AICU reset.

95

Q

LVOPS – TOUCHDOWN ZONE LIGHTING FAILURE

  • Passing 2000’RA ATC: “Our runway monitoring systems have indicated
    that the Touchdown zone lighting has failed. Check your minima and
    Cleared to land runway XX”
  • Provide the crew with an RVR that allows them to land without the TDZL
  • Crew will possibly need to review the LIDO RM and break off the approach

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Continue to land or Go-around?
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (P) Correct application of procedures

Lido 8.9.2

Likely better to discontinue the approach if doubts about whether ground equipment degradation permits landing or not under the circ*mstances.

96

Q

LVOPS – VIS LESS THAN 125 M MOMENTARILY AFTER 100 KTS DURING
TAKE-OFF

CAT IIIB LDG after 100 kts for
momentarily, then back to CAT IIIB T/O

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (D) Startle effect
  • (H) Accurate tracking of the centreline by using the Yaw bar

  • OM-A Operational Procedures – LVO Take-off

According to OM-A 8.4.4.1 - d and e, take-off should be continued at speeds above 100 kts making use of centreline guidance (Yaw Bar).

97

Q

MISC – L CKPT WINDSHIELD ELEC ARCING

WINDSHIELD HEATG FAULT (NO HEAT) –
LEFT
Activate 1 min AFTER the HANDOUT has been given to CM1

  • Anytime above FL200, handout the printout of the CAPT WINDSHIELD
    ARCING doc found on Training Resources to the CM1
  • Printout states: “You can smell something burning and you have seen a
    small puff of smoke coming from the top left corner of your windshield”
  • Do not mention the word “Arcing” to the crew
  • 1 min after the handout has been given to the crew; Activate the
    WINDSHIELD HEATG FAULT

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Abn Non-sensed Ecam
  • (D) Continue/Return/Divert
  • (P) Ecam handling + Computer reset

  • Abnormal Not-Sensed > MISC > CKPT WINDOW CRACKED
  • Pulling of the AICU1 triggers A-ICE CTL SYS FAULT; ENG A/I 2+4 is listed
    as INOP but Airbus has confirmed that the ENG A/I 2+4 fails in the open
    position
  • If CM1 still PF during descent, state to the crew that the left windshield is
    completely fogged up due to the lack of heating. Consideration for CM2 to
    be PF

Abnormal Not-Sensed > MISC > CKPT WINDOW CRACKED

When the cracks are on the exterior side of the heat bars the structure is not affected and the flight can be continued. Windshield or window arcing is not likely to occur.

If unable to detect which layer is cracked, differential pressure must be reduced to 5PSI. To avoid CAB PRESS EXCESS CAB ALT, descent to FL230 should be initiated.

To avoid arcing, turn off heating through AICU reset.

If visibility is not available, consider autoland. If autoland is not available, consider opening window on PF’s side after cabin depressurization.

98

Q

MISC – OIS FAULT CAPT

OIS FAULT
Preset at V1+5 kts – CAPT

  • The CAPTs OIT becomes blank due to and internal power failure. No ECAM
    warnings are triggered. There is no rush to address the problem and it can
    be delayed until time and the ANC permits

(DoD 2)

A

  • (P) Application of Procedures
  • (H) Handling
  • (M) Manages correctly the use of the CAPT’s laptop for the remainder of the
    flight
  • (D) Continue or divert

  • Not-sensed proc.
  • The CAPT Laptop will not be affected, and after an OIT reset (this takes
    4 mins) the OIT screen remains blank. This will require the CAPT to remove
    the laptop from its stowage and use it for the remainder of the flight to
    access all FLT OPS dark green domain functions. The crew will manage this
    process during the flight. The laptop should be re-stowed prior to landing
  • The NSS FLT OPS reset procedure should not be conducted as this is only
    used if both CAPT and FO OITs are affected

ECP ABN PROC pb/MISCELLANEOUS Menu

-Check that the affected side laptop is working (keyboard, mouse, screen, etc)
-If Laptop is working:
-OIT OFF for 5 secs then ON (Allow 4 minutes booting and connecting)
-If after 4 minutes it is not working, use the onside Laptop. Laptop must be stowed before Landing Gear Extension.

Consider using the EPT for charts/manuals, being careful to make sure all data is valid (AC registration, charts dates, etc)

99

Q

MISC – R CKPT WINDOW CRACKED (EXTERNAL LAYER)

  • Loud bang (handclap), examiner clips/tapes the laminated sheet displaying
    a cracked windshield, on the CM2 sun visor

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) Abnormal Not-sensed procedure + difference between internal/external
  • (P) ECAM actions
  • (M) Task Sharing

  • Use a printed copy of the FO WINDSHIELD CRACKED doc found on
    Training resources Examiner only; manually write “exterior side”, before
    giving it to the crew
  • The External layer is affected (crack on exterior side of the heat bars)
  • If CM2 is still PF during descent, state that the right windshield is completely
    shattered, making it impossible to look through

When the cracks are on the exterior side of the heat bars the structure is not affected and the flight can be continued. Windshield or window arcing is not likely to occur.

If unable to detect which layer is cracked, differential pressure must be reduced to 5PSI. To avoid CAB PRESS EXCESS CAB ALT, descent to FL230 should be initiated.

To avoid arcing, turn off heating through AICU reset.

If visibility is not available, consider autoland. If autoland is not available, consider opening window on PF’s side after cabin depressurization.

100

Q

MISC – R CKPT WINDOW CRACKED (INTERNAL LAYER)

WINDSHIELD HEATG FAULT (NO HEAT) –
RIGHT
Activate anytime in climb above FL200

(DoD 3)

A

  • (K) Computer reset/Abn Non-sensed Ecam
  • (D) Continue/Return/Divert
  • (P) Ecam handling + Computer reset

  • ECAM A-ICE R WINDSHIELD HEATG FAULT, right windshield heating has
    failed due to an overheat, short-circuit or failure of the windshield
    temperature sensors
  • AICU 2 Reset is available, but is not successful
  • Minimum 3 min after ECAM, loud bang (handclap), examiner clips/tapes the
    laminated sheet displaying a cracked windshield, on the CM2 sun visor
  • Handout a printed copy of the “FO CRACKED WINDSHIELD” document
    found on Training Resources > A380 > Examiners > Recurrent EBT > Latest
    Phase
  • As the Internal layer is affected (crack on co*ckpit side of the heat bars),
    descent to FL230. Increased fuel consumption
  • Abnormal Not-Sensed > MISC > CKPT WINDOW CRACKED: ECAM will
    request pulling of AICU 2; ENG A/I 1+3 is listed in the INOP ITEMS,
    however Airbus has confirmed that ENG A/I 1+3 Fails in an open position
  • If REPOS is required, examiner will set CAB ALT MODE back to AUTO, as
    this should be done at TOD in accordance with the deferred procedure

When the cracks are on the exterior side of the heat bars the structure is not affected and the flight can be continued. Windshield or window arcing is not likely to occur.

If unable to detect which layer is cracked, differential pressure must be reduced to 5PSI. To avoid CAB PRESS EXCESS CAB ALT, descent to FL230 should be initiated.

To avoid arcing, turn off heating through AICU reset.

If visibility is not available, consider autoland. If autoland is not available, consider opening window on PF’s side after cabin depressurization.

101

Q

NAV – BLOCKED PITOT PROBE ADR 1(2)

MULTI FUNCTION PROBE
HEATG FAULT – ADR 1 (ADR2 IF CM2 PF) Preset passing radio altitude
2500’

  • Only use this event when operation in icing conditions. Works best with
    MOD icing

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Startle effect
  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling

  • If the crew decide that safe conduct of the flight is impacted they may opt to
    UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED memory items
  • ECAM actions require PROBE HEAT ON but this will not recover the ADR
    probes
  • The MFD HEATG FAULT is not inserted until passing 2500’RA to allow time
    for the crew to initially detect and handle the false instrument indications on
    the PM’s PFD before the ECAM warning is triggered
  • There is a risk of undue overspeed warnings occurring if the climb is
    continued before the ECAM actions are conducted
  • The blocked PITOT will result in ADR 1(2) being rejected by the PRIMs and
    the PM will use AIR DATA SWTG to select ADR 3 on the FOs side
  • Landing capability CAT 3 SINGLE
  • MFP heating is not controlled by the AICU, reset will not resolve the problem

According to the FCOM, it should be mostly a non-event except for the likely startle effect. It will require to use Air Data SWTG to 3 on the affected side. CAT3 Single will be the maximum attainable. The MEL allows dispatch with the fault.

If the safety of the flight is impacted (unable to discern which airspeed indication is faulty and it affects the safety) then the Unreliable Airspeed Indication should be recalled (It is found in ABN PROC in the ECAM):

AP - OFF
A/THR - OFF
FD - OFF

Before THRRED:
All Thr Levers - TOGA
Pitch Target - 12.5 deg below 10000, 10 deg above

After THRRED:
—-If derated Climb - All thr levers - MCT—-
All Thr Levers - CLB
Pitch target - 12.5 below 10, 10 deg btwn 10-25, 5 deg above

If flaps are full, select Flap 3
Maintain Flap/LG config
Speed brakes check retracted

Risk of undue overspeed warnings.

RESPECT STALL WARNINGS!!!

Since we still have reliable Air Data, it isn’t required to turn off the ADRs, or use the BUSS.

102

Q

NAV – BOTH AP + FD INOP DOUBLE ADR FAULT

NAV – ADIRS – ADR 3 – Activate anytime after passing FL100

NAV – ADIRS – ADR OFFSIDE (PM) – Activate no earlier than just
before descent

(DoD 3)

A

  • (H) Manual flight high altitude
  • (D) Continue/Divert/Return
  • (K) RVSM
  • (M) Task sharing
  • (L) Giving effective direction

  • AP + FD Lost immediately after entering the second fault
  • Not to be used with BLOCKED PITOT PROBE ADR 2 event
  • If MCC is contacted, no reset is possible
  • Considerations for RVSM, MNPS. Refer to FCOM > PROC > SPECIAL
    OPS > RVSM for limitations, lowest non-RVSM level FL290 E, FL280 W
  • Landing capability is CAT 1 ONLY; if not in radar environment, all arrivals/
    approaches shall be flown procedurally. If no other faults, FLS capability is
    F-APP+RAW
  • This event is not to be used in challenging weather conditions – max XWD
    20 kts, max turbulence light, min vis 3000 m, min cloud base minima+200

Based on actual AKL-MEL flight.

The ECAM will ask to switch the affected ADRs off, WXR, TAWS, XPDR and TCAS to non-affected System. Soft GA is lost.

Before shutting down the engines on the ground, turn the affected IR Mode Selectors to OFF, otherwise only one APU Gen will come online as the aircraft is not aware that it is on ground.

Alternate Law, Prots lost, Load Alleviation, Gust Load protection, BTV, ROW/ROP, Autoland, CAT1 limited, etc, loss of RVSM and RNAV capability.

Will have to fly raw data. Think 737-200. Use navaid page as required, request radar vector, PM to monitor carefully against charts and act on AFS CP under command of the PF. Approach phase can be activated, use the bird, consider use of TRK+FPA and advise ATC you will be flying tracks instead of headings, also, coordinate with ATC as RVSM and RNP capability is lost, no CPDLC or ADS.

103

Q

NAV – BTV REVERTS TO HI DUE TO ARPT NAV FAULT

NAVIGATION – OANS – AIRPORT NAV
FAULT
ARM Preselect criteria 700’RA

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) BTV/OANS
  • (D) Continue approach or go-around

  • Only use this event, if BTV is planned and used
  • ECAM NAV ARPT NAV FAULT is inhibited from 800 ft till 80 kts after
    landing
  • FMA displays Autobrake HI after fault is entered
  • OANS and ROW/ROP not available

The BTV system uses information from:
-on board airport navigation system OANS
-airport navigation display on ND
-auto flight system (PRIM)
-braking system
-flight warning system
-display system
-landing runway selected on fms

ROW/ROP
Lost if:
-aircraft position is erroneous
-data inconsistency in airport navigation database
-landing runway is not known by the system

Beware that keeping autobrake at HI will severely heat up the brakes.

104

Q

NAV – FM/GPS POSITION DISAGREE

Activate anytime above FL100

  • Before activating fault, GPS PRIMARY needs to be active for >10 min

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge, Accuracy check, available type of approaches
  • (P) NAV accuracy check

  • ECAM NAV FM/GPS DISAGREE, INFO RAW ONLY
  • A discrepancy is detected between FMS and GPS position
  • TERR on ND is INOP (CM1+2), no OANS, no BTV
  • FCOM guidance: For flight continuation, consider periodic NAV Accuracy
    check

Use Position/Monitor page on FMS.

FCTM SUPP/NAV Acuracy/NAVIGATION ACCURACY XCHECK + CREW STRATEGY

-If GPS Primary displayed, nav xcheck not required.

-If GPS Primary lost, xcheck required in climb, cruise, every 45mins, before TOD, reaching TMA, before start of approach, and whenever any doubt.

THERE ARE 2 TECHNIQUES:

  1. Position/monitor page, select a navaid and compare bearing/distance with raw data.
  2. On ND, compare needle and DME (raw data) with position of the navaid symbol and range ring.

If NAV ACCY DEGRADED, means the EPU is higher than the RNP in progress page and will be together with a triple click sound.

Consider speaking to VPNC to negotiate flying through any RNP required airspace such as Emirates FIR.

If flying across the Atlantic, let ATC know right away as well as you will have to monitor the NAV ACCY as it will continue to degrade due to lack of Navaid updates.

105

Q

NAV – GPS 1 +2 FAULT

GPS FAULT – 2
Activate anytime above FL100

After 2 min: GPS FAULT – 1

  • ECAM NAV GPS 1+2 FAULT + GPS PRIMARY LOST

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) Approach capability
  • (K) System knowledge and minimum NAV requirement for enroute and
    approach

  • Refer to FCTM > SUPP INFO > Navigation Accuracy for accuracy check
  • If using this event, try to let the crew fly a AOILS (RNAV, LOC, VOR), in
    order to test for understanding of F-APP capability for the different
    approaches
  • RNP Capability: FCOM > PROC > SPECIAL OPS > RNP

Use Position/Monitor page on FMS.

FCTM SUPP/NAV Acuracy/NAVIGATION ACCURACY XCHECK + CREW STRATEGY

-If GPS Primary displayed, nav xcheck not required.

-If GPS Primary lost, xcheck required in climb, cruise, every 45mins, before TOD, reaching TMA, before start of approach, and whenever any doubt.

THERE ARE 2 TECHNIQUES:

  1. Position/monitor page, select a navaid and compare bearing/distance with raw data.
  2. On ND, compare compare needle and DME (raw data) with position of the navaid symbol and range ring.

For RNP AR Approaches, GPS IS REQUIRED.

If F-APP or F-APP+RAW capability is lost, do NOT use FLS function.

To use RNP 1 (STARs), DME+DME is required.

If NAV ACCY DEGRADED, means the EPU is higher than the RNP in progress page and will be together with a triple click sound.

Consider speaking to VPNC to negotiate flying through any RNP required airspace such as Emirates FIR.

If flying across the Atlantic, let ATC know right away as well as you will have to monitor the NAV ACCY as it will continue to degrade due to lack of Navaid updates.

106

Q

NAV – GS TRANSMITTER FAILURE

ARM Preselect criteria 2500 ft RA on Approach

  • Only use with ILS approach and if another approach at the airport is
    available

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Continue for a different approach or G/A
  • (K) Difference in indication between GS transmitter & receiver fault
  • (S) Awareness of GS fault and pre-planning of SEC FPLN
  • (A) Use of Automatics

  • Some airports might have no LOC minima’s published (e.g. JNB)
  • ATC does not advise about the transmitter fault until questioned by the crew

If the receiver fails, a red G/S flag will appear on the corresponding failed receiver’s display (PFD and ND in rose LS). If the transmitter fails, the diamond disappears (or half diamond if full deflection).

If both ILS receivers fail, the autopilot will also disengage if loc is either armed or engaged. Triple click and FD bars flash.

Remember that there are two ways of selecting a LOC only approach, one is to deselect the Glideslope in the Pos Monitor page, and the other one is to lineselect the appropriate LOC approach in the FMS. The latter option is preferable, particularly if the LOC and ILS approaches have different glidepath angles.

107

Q

NAV – IR 1(2) ATT DISAGREE

NAVIGATION – ADIRS – CAPT & FO ATT
DISAGREE (BANK)

Activate fault when in a turn before starting approach,
select PF side, (1 for CAPT or 2 for FO)

  • Bank increases by 8 degrees in 5 seconds
  • ECAM NAV CAPT & FO ATT DISAGREE when bank difference >5 deg
  • Red CHECK ATT on PFD’s (flashes for 9 sec, then remains steady)

(DoD 2)

A

  • (M) Protection of ANC
  • (P) ECAM handling
  • (K) Navigations

  • Landing Capability is CAT 3 SINGLE

Xcheck with ISIS to discard the faulty ATT indicator, then select IR3 on the failed side.
If flying straight and level, also check that heading is not changing.

Remember you are now CAT3 Single

108

Q

NAV – IR 1(2) FAULT (AT VR)

IR1(2) FAULT – IR1 IF CM1
PF, IR2 IF CM2 PF
ARM BEFORE Take-off, preselect criteria speed at VR

  • PF will loose Attitude indicator on PF. Handover control to other pilot during
    take-off

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) ANC as the first priority
  • (D) Startle effect + possible diversion or return due to landing capability

  • Landing capability CAT 3 SINGLE

On the ND 1(2); Heading information is lost. Red HDG and MAP NOT AVAILABLE • On the VD 1(2); Weather/terrain information are lost •

Displays are normal after ATT HDG switching

use ATT HDG SWTG as per ECAM to recover PFD on PF side.

IF IR1 fails, TCAS, WXR, TERR SYS, ADS-B RPTG 1, etc must switch over to IR2, and viceversa.

109

Q

NAV – IRS ATT DISAGREE

CAPT & FO ATT DISAGREE
(BANK)

Activate in Cruise. To be triggered on the side of the PF with a Jet Upset

  • This event is to be triggered on the side of the pilot (or AP) who is the PF at
    the time when the Jet Upset recovery occurs. The triggering of this event
    may affect the final stages of the Jet Upset recovery and require the PF to
    disconnect the AP and take manual control of the aircraft
  • An ECAM warning will trigger when the discrepancy between the ATT
    parameters exceeds 5° bank and should occur approx. 5 secs after the
    malfunction is triggered

(DoD 2)

A

  • (A) Use of Automation
  • (D) Problem Solving and Decision Making

  • PF should reference the ISIS, and the crew will use the ISIS to crosscheck
    which is the malfunctioning IR. ATT HDG SWTG will be used to switch the
    affected side to IR 3
  • Landing capability is CAT 3 SINGLE

Xcheck with ISIS to discard the faulty ATT indicator, then select IR3 on the failed side.
If flying straight and level, also check that heading is not changing.

Remember you are now CAT3 Single

110

Q

NAVIGATION: m-CD AIRPORT DATABASE AFTER DISPATCH (OANS)

Activate after dispatch prior to take off

  • During taxi out activate the fault.

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge of OANS, and BTV, ROW/ROP faults and their
    effect.
  • (P) Application of MEL, Failures prior to take off (m-CD).
  • (SA) Awareness of braking performance considerations and runway exit
    planning due to no BTV and ROW/ROP availability.

  • Crew should apply the MEL m-CD procedure as documented in the MEL
    preamble.
  • An OANS fault will mean the BTV and ROW/ROW are not available.

Consider this failure when landing, as MROT may be harder to comply with, as well as may generate higher brake temperatures if classic autobrake is used. Brief PM to assist you during landing roll with identification of proper runway exit and advice ATC if unable to comply with MROT procedure.

111

Q

NAV – MFP HEATING FAULT

NAV-SENSORS – MULTI FUNCTION PROBE
HEATG FAULT – ADR 1
Activate anytime above 5000 ft in Icing conditions

  • Only use this event in Cold Weather OPS

(DoD 2)

A

  • As the probes are not de-iced three seconds after the PROBE HEAT is
    manually turned ON, ECAM will ask to switch AIR DATA SWTG to CAPT on
    3
  • During the approach into icing conditions, wind readouts on CM1 ND might
    be unreliable as it uses ADR 1 in the background. Strong tailwinds on the
    CAPT ND should be disregarded and the CM2 ND used for reliable wind
    info. TAS and GS on CM1 ND are correct
  • FCOM reference for the fault is ATA 30 A-ICE ALL PROBES 1 NOT
    DEICED, as this will be the ECAM that will eventually be triggered
  • AICU reset to be considered
  • Landing capability CAT 3 SINGLE

The automatic heating fails, therefore ECAM asks to manually turn it on. If after manually turning it on, it still isn’t deiced, then Air Data Switching is requested by the ECAM.

112

Q

NAV – MMR FAULT (FINAL APPROACH)

MMR FAULT
(RECEIVER) – ON PF SIDE
Activate passing 1200’RA on final approach

  • ECAM warnings will be triggered for an associated LS FAULT and GPS
    FAULT. This indicates that the MMR has failed. The AP will remain engaged

(DoD 1)

A

  • (H) Smooth handling of Aircraft in approach
  • (K) Knowledge
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight

  • The ILS approach can be continued and approach capability is CAT 1
  • A go-around should not be required

Consider CAT1 MINIMA

Also consider switching Weather radar and TAWS to working system to recover information on VD/ND

ECAM actions can be quickly done and approach continued if above CAT1 minima.

113

Q

NAV – MMR FAULT (TAKE-OFF)

RADIO NAVIGATION – MMR FAULT
(RECEIVER) 1
ARM BEFORE Take-off, preselect criteria speed at VR

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Possible diversion due to landing capability
  • (K) System knowledge of LS system

  • Total internal failure of the MMR; ECAM NAV GPS1 and LS1 FAULT
  • AP will remain engaged, Landing capability CAT 1
  • LS 2 is available on CM1 ND and CM2 PFD

Consider CAT1 MINIMA

Also consider switching Weather radar and TAWS to working system to recover information on VD/ND

114

Q

NAV – PARTIAL PITOT BLOCKAGE DUE TO ICE CRYSTALS (>FL250)

NAVIGATION PARTIAL PITOT BLOCKAGE
ADR 1 (or 2) + STBY
IF CM1 is PF choose ADR1, IF CM2 is PF choose ADR2
ACTIVATE in CLIMB when above FL250; first ADR 1 (or 2), then 5 s later
STBY
Clear Fault when ECAM AIR DATA SWTG is completed

  • Only use event if operating around convective weather

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) ANC as the first priority
  • (K) Knowledge of ADR systems and ISIS

  • Simulates rapid loss of IAS due to ice crystals; stabilises around 100KIAS
  • If safe conduct of the flight is not impacted: Unreliable Airspeed Memory
    items might not be needed. AP/FD do not disconnect as 2 good ADR’s are
    still available
  • ECAM NAV AIR DATA DISAGREE will trigger. ADR1 (or 2) and STBY
    instruments are rejected by the PRIMS
  • After clearing malfunction, ASI returns back to normal but fault will remain
    latched. Crew can consider ECAM SWTG back to NORM
  • PRIM 1 and PRIM 3 reset might be needed by examiner after session to
    unlatch the fault

(Event ends after ECAM AIR DATA SWTG is completed)

After the startle event and according to the FCOM, it should be mostly a non-event. There is the possibility that if both ADR are failed at the same time and both give the same erroneous reading the PRIMS may reject the ADR giving correct readings, but that would only happen in case the failure is triggered at the same time.

It will require to use Air Data SWTG to 3 on the affected side. CAT3 Single will be the maximum attainable. The MEL allows dispatch with the fault.

If the safety of the flight is impacted (unable to discern which airspeed indication is faulty and it affects the safety) then the Unreliable Airspeed Indication should be recalled (It is found in ABN PROC in the ECAM):

AP - OFF
A/THR - OFF
FD - OFF

Before THRRED:
All Thr Levers - TOGA
Pitch Target - 12.5 deg below 10000, 10 deg above

After THRRED:
—-If derated Climb - All thr levers - MCT—-
All Thr Levers - CLB
Pitch target - 12.5 below 10, 10 deg btwn 10-25, 5 deg above

If flaps are full, select Flap 3
Maintain Flap/LG config
Speed brakes check retracted

Risk of undue overspeed warnings.

RESPECT STALL WARNINGS!!!

Since we still have reliable Air Data, it isn’t required to turn off the ADRs, or use the BUSS.

115

Q

NAV RA FAULTS A+C (LVO APPROACH)

RADIO – NAVIGATION – RA SYS FAULT
(A & C)
Activate on approach, before intercepting GS
(Only to be given with RVR > 300 m)

(DoD 1)

A

  • (A) Correct use of Autoflight
  • (M) Correct assessment of options available
  • (S) Situational Awareness
  • (D) Decision to continue approach to Cat II minima

  • In the FMA, the message CAT 2 is displayed
  • The radio height information is still displayed on CAPT and F/O PFD
  • Observe crew revert to Cat II minima and re-brief relevant differences from
    planned approach (Cat III)

RVR may be reduced from 350 to 300 if CATII autoland is to be performed. (OM-A 8.1.4.3.2.2)

In any case, if any doubt exists it is better to cancel the approach, re-assess the landing capability, and then make a more educated decision.

116

Q

OXY – CKPT BOTTLE PRESS LO

CKPT BOTTLE PRESS LO
Activate any time after passing FL300

  • ECAM OXY CKPT BOTTLE PRESS LO comes at 350 psi

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) OM-A Knowledge
  • (D) Decision on initial descent to FL250 or lower and appropriate decision
    to return or divert if fuel does not allow continuation to destination

  • Max FL250 in accordance with OM-A 8.8 Oxygen Requirements
  • If a lower FL is requested without PANPAN/MAYDAY, ATC will advise to
    STBY
  • 2 Portable OXY bottles are available if crew request cabin crew

Check if any masks are incorrectly stowed!

The absolute minimum oxygen required to operate with 2 pilots is around 600PSI.

A pressurized flight may be operated up to FL250 if the crew oxygen system becomes inoperative/empty, provided portable oxygen bottles are readily available for each flight crew member on duty.

Above FL250 the quick donning crew oxygen system must be fully serviceable. All flight crew members on duty shall have their oxygen mask available for use should the necessity arise.

You have to request the cabin crew to bring portable oxygen bottles for both the captain and FO.

Afterwards, based on FL250, use In-flt performance to confirm if destination cannot be reached or appropriate diversion.

117

Q

SMOKE – AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE (Fault clears during QRH proc)

SMOKE – AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE
Activate anytime after aircraft in clean configuration
When crew select Pack 1 or 2 OFF (at examiners discretion) clear AIR
CONDITIONING SMOKE

PURSER: “Captain, I can see white smoke coming out of the overhead
gaspers”. If further questioned; all cabins on both levels.

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) Managing stress. Completes required tasks and sets priorities
  • (P) Correct application of Procedures
  • (C) Appropriate communication with other CM, Cabin Crew, PAX and ATC
  • (D) Continue, return, divert decision. Appropriate level of urgency

  • Observe crew actioning Not Sensed Abn Proc and QRH procedure without
    delay.
  • Observe PF protecting ANC and stating the appropriate level of urgency to
    ATC (Mayday…).
  • Observe appropriate communication with cabin crew and passengers.
  • Did crew follow Consideration about Diversion guidance in FCTM?
  • Observe crew considering a different diversion option/continue if the initial
    decision was marginal due to time constraints/performance/wx etc.
  • Observe crew reconsider the level of urgency when fault clears (Pan…).
  • Observe appropriate coordination with VPNC/ATC for any issues after
    landing.

Protect ANCs, step 1 is to protect ourselves, either put oxy masks on by memory, or following the immediate actions in the smoke/fumes checklist.

Next, initiate diversion and declare Mayday. ABN PROC will send the PM to use the QRH.

If smoke is coming from the vents, presume Air Conditioning is the source and follow the correct section of the checklist. PF and PM should communicate with each other to make sure both agree on this and time is not wasted.

Also, request information from Cabin Crew. FCTM has some important points such as what different smells may be indicating where the smoke could be coming from.

If Air Conditioning smoke is suspected, it may trigger several alerts in other areas (lavatories, etc). If an engine or APU failed, particularly with damage or fire, then some of that may be going through the bleed system and may take some time to dissipate.

When some time is available, if possible perform a PA to reassure the passengers that the crew is in control of the situation.

Advice Purser we are initiating a diversion and to let us know if there’s changes in the quantity of smoke in the cabin (how many rows can she/he see) and if the smoke is still coming out of the vents or any other places or if it stops.

In the event the smoke stops, and there is strong evidence that the smoke/fumes are stopped and no longer pose a dire threat, situation may be stepped down from time-critical, but keep in mind that passengers and crew may have suffered respiratory system damage and may need medical assistance.

If smoke becomes very dense, and the greatest threat, consider using QRH Removal of Smoke/Fumes checklist.

If situation is unmanageable, consider landing/ditching.

118

Q

SMOKE – AFT CARGO

Activate approx. 20 min before landing, initially intermittent (3 ×
activation for 2 s), then after 1 min, continuous ON

  • No signs of smoke in the cabin

(DoD 3)

A

  • (M) High workload due to smoke warning
  • (D) Decision on evacuation, pre-cautionary or normal disembarkation
  • (C) Good Cabin crew and Fire services communication

  • BTL 2 light will only illuminate 200 s after discharge (in actual aircraft
    240 min)
  • In case of precautionary disembarkation, steps at remote position are only
    available if crew has requested minimum 10 min before landing
  • FIRE Crew requests to open Cargo door ASAP (not in accordance with
    ECAM)

Cargo compartments have 2 bottles, they are shared, therefore if used to extinguish a fire in one compartment, the other compartment no longer has any bottles left.

The system will suppress the fire for 4 hours. Bottle 1 is bigger but discharges in about 1 minute, bottle 2 is smaller but discharges slowly for about 4 hours.

Expect smoke warning to remain for remaining of the flight (gases and agents in compartment).

Once isolation valves closed, cargo temp is not reliable.

Maintain good communication with cabin crew, as well as declare emergency with ATC.

Upon landing, do not let ground crew open the cargo compartment until pax disembark and fire brigade is present.

Consider NOTOCs!

Upon landing, you will need the fire brigade to inspect before considering vacating the runway. If available, ask them to check with Infrared or heat sensing cameras to check whether the AFT cargo is emanating heat or not. If it is, consider precautionary disembarkation/evacuation on runway. Perhaps another source of information may be coming from main deck cabin crew in the aft of the aircraft if they sense any heat on the floor areas. NITS and PA should be used to inform crew and passengers if time permits.

119

Q

SMOKE – AFT GALLEY

Activate anytime above FL100

  • PURSER: “Captain, we had smoke from an oven in aft galley, one
    Halon has been discharged, and the oven has been switched off. Can
    we pull the circuit breakers for oven?”
  • The Purser will be somewhat vague initially about the cause of the smoke.
    The crew wil use appropriate communication to obtain the information they require to determine the problem and consider their decisions

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Knowledge
  • (A) Application of Procedures
  • (C) Communication with Cabin Crew

  • The crew should consider SMOKE/FUMES ABN PROC while further
    information is being sought. The oven C/Bs may be pulled as requested by
    the Purser
  • The cabin crew advises that the source of the smoke has been identified as
    some paper wrapping that was left in the oven and ignited when the oven
    was switched ON. That small fire is now out, the oven is now secure, no
    more smoke is present, and there are no other parts of the galley that have
    been affected
  • The crew will consider their options and a continuation to Dubai is an
    appropriate decision. The CAPT should consider a PA to the passengers
  • If consulted the VPNC will advise that MCC have no indications of any
    malfunctions and they would recommend the flight continue if the oven fire
    has been extinguished

(Event ends when decision is made to continue the flight)

It is imperative to get further information from the Purser before starting the decision making process. Is the fire out? Is there smoke still coming out of the oven? What was the source of fire/smoke, and has it been isolated and extinguished completely? Keep me informed if the situation changes or develops.

Make a PA to passengers to reassure them that the situation is under control.

120

Q

SMOKE – AVNCS SMOKE (Fault clears during QRH proc)

SMOKE – SMOKE MAIN AVIONIC LEFT
Activate anytime above FL100
Clear AVIONIC SMOKE 2 min after crew select GEN 1+2 OFF iaw. QRH proc

Note: Only use this event if 2 usable airports with NPA weather are
available within 45 minutes flying time.

(DoD 4)

A

  • (M) Managing stress. Completes required tasks and sets priorities
  • (P) Correct application of Procedures
  • (C) Appropriate communication with other CM, Cabin Crew, PAX and ATC
  • (D) Continue, return, divert decision. Changes initial plan if appropriate.
    Appropriate level of urgency

  • Observe crew actioning ECAM and QRH procedure without delay.
  • This is a very challenging event, examiners should consider adding events
    or MEL prior to this event to achieve required DoD.
  • Observe PF protecting ANC and stating the appropriate level of urgency to
    ATC (Mayday…).
  • Observe appropriate communication with cabin crew and passengers
  • Observe crew initiating a diversion with minimum delay.
  • Observe crew considering a different diversion option/continue if the initial
    decision was marginal due to time constraints/performance/wx etc.
  • Observe crew reconsider the level of urgency when fault clears (Pan…).
  • Observe appropriate coordination with VPNC/ATC for any issues after
    landing.

Protect ANCs, step 1 is to protect ourselves, either put oxy masks on by memory, or following the immediate actions in the smoke/fumes checklist.

Next, initiate diversion and declare Mayday. ABN PROC will send the PM to use the QRH.

If smoke is coming from AVNCS/ELECTRICAL, follow the correct section of the checklist. PF and PM should communicate with each other to make sure both agree on this and time is not wasted.

When some time is available, if possible perform a PA to reassure the passengers that the crew is in control of the situation.

Advice Purser we are initiating a diversion and to let us know if there is smoke in the cabin (how many rows can she see) and where the smoke is coming out of or if it stops.

In the event the smoke stops, and there is strong evidence that the smoke/fumes no longer pose a threat, situation may be stepped down from time-critical, but keep in mind that passengers and crew may have suffered respiratory damage and may need medical assistance.

If smoke becomes very dense, and the greatest threat, consider using QRH Removal of Smoke/Fumes checklist.

If situation is unmanageable, consider landing/ditching.

In this case, after turning GEN 1+2 OFF, we are only left with GEN 3+4 which should be sufficient to continue feeding the whole electrical system. Having said that, CAT3B capability is lost.

121

Q

SMOKE – IFE BAY (INTERMITTENT)

SMOKE – SMOKE IN-FLIGHT
ENTERTAINMENT CENTER
Activate anytime in climb above FL100, cancel fault 30 sec after IFEC is
turned OFF

(DoD 2)

A

  • (K) Position of the IFE Bay
  • (D) Continue/Return/Divert
  • (C) Communication with cabin crew

  • Access to the IFE bay is through the Upper Avionics Bay Access door in the
    right hand Spa. Key is kept in a pouch in the left hand flight deck cupboard
  • If Cabin crew are questioned, they do not know where the IFE Bay is on the
    aircraft
  • If asked, no visible signs of smoke in the right hand Spa
  • After a few minutes, purser asks if the IFE can be switched back on, as there
    is no smoke

After the warning and smoke is gone, IFE should NOT be turned back on.

Consider activating Abnormal Proc - Fire Smoke/Fumes checklist. Activating this procedure will lead to the QRH checklist.

Key is kept in a pouch in the left hand flight deck cupboard.

Make sure Cabin Crew follow procedures for firefighting if they are going to check in the right hand side spa (a firefighter and an assistance, bring fire extinguisher, smoke hood, etc).

122

Q

SMOKE – MAIN DECK LAVATORY

for 5 seconds then cancel malfunction
Activate anytime above FL150 with seat belts off

  • 5 seconds delay between activating the fault and actual master warning
  • If crew call CABIN immediately, delay picking up the cabin interphone. After
    a second try, Purser: “There is no more smoke warning on the FAP.
    Somebody must have reset it. Which toilet was it? I will call you back”
  • ECAM only shows MAIN DECK. After 1 min the purser calls back: “The CSV
    at ML5 pressed the Smoke reset button on the mini-FAP and she
    doesn’t remember which toilet it was”
  • After a few min, Purser: “Captain, we think it was a female passenger
    who used hairspray in a toilet near ML5. This must have set off the
    smoke detector”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (C) Good comms with cabin crew/possible PA to Pax
  • (K) LAV Smoke system
  • (L) Teamwork between all crewmembers

  • Expectation is for the crew to ask more detailed questions to CC and not
    take it for granted that it was just a “hairspray” incident or coming from an
    un-identified lavatory. Questions such as; Which lavatory? Did you check all
    the bins of the surrounding toilets? Any smell? How did you know it was
    hairspray?
  • For more info refer to OM-E > A380 > 7.15, Smoke Detection System

Assume the warning is real until confirmed by the Cabin Crew that all Lavs have been throughly checked and the location of the “hairspray” lav has been correctly identified.

If necessary, do a PA to remind the passengers that this is a non-smoking aircraft/flight.

Also, ask the purser to let the crew know to be more careful when observing such cautions/warnings on the FAP/mini-FAP.

OM-E says that the Lavatory with smoke warning will have the Lavatory call light flashing, and in the Smoke Detect page of FAP they should be able to see which lavatory it was even after pressing the reset button.

123

Q

STEER – N/W STEER FAULT DURING LANDING

STEERING: STEER N/W SYS FAULT
NORMAL
Activate immediately after touchdown

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge “steer endurance limited”
  • (C) With ATC, Cabin Crew and Pax

  • Fault is inhibited from touchdown till 80 kts after landing
  • ALTN N/W Steering available with “Steer endurance limited”. Expect crew
    to vacate and then request towing. Tow bar might not be available
    depending on the airport
  • FCOM Computer reset to be consulted but not allowed due to fault

Can steer for a short time and then it overheats.

First of all, protect the ANCs.

You should be able to vacate the runway, but not much more. Advise ATC of the failure, and that a tug will be required once workload permits.
A PA will be an effective and efficient way to let the Passengers know to remain seated until aircraft is at final parking position due to the requirement for a tow into stand, and at the same time inform the Cabin Crew.

If a proper towbar is required and not available, then the towbar in the bulk compartment will be needed. There is further information in FCOM-PRO-SUP-EK Pushback using portable towbar.

124

Q

STEER – TILLER FAULT (ON PF SIDE)

STEERING: STEER TILLER FAULT L or R
(PF side)
Preselect criteria Radio Altitude 500 ft

(DoD 1)

A

  • (L) Crew coordination and teamwork required
  • (D) Startle effect

  • Fault is inhibited from 800 ft RA till 80 kts after landing
  • Expect crew to stop on the runway or taxiway, transfer control & continue

Hand over controls to check if other tiller works, advice ATC immediately once aircraft is slowed down and under control since you may require additional time to vacate if you missed the desired exit.

Analyze computer reset, make sure the fault is covered in procedure, if NOT, reset must not be attempted.

Advice ATC, Purser, PAX that we will be stopping on the runway or taxiway to attempt to resolve the issue. If cannot be resolved, advise VPNC and a TOW must be requested.

DO NOT RESET BOTH BSCS simultaneously!

In THIS case, once xfer of control is done, and the other tiller works, runway may be vacated, just beware of the guidance to stand if CM2 is taxiing. If required, request a marshall or tug to be towed in if the guidance cannot be used.

125

Q

SURV – WXR 1+2 FAULT (RECOVER WXR 2 AFTER RESET)

WXR FAULT 1 at 500 FT RA

WXR FAULT 2 at 1500 FT RA

Clear WXR FAULT 2 when AESU 2 RESET button is pulled

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) System knowledge AESU Reset
  • (S) Position of severe weather before loss of weather radar

  • At STS, crew should attempt an AESU RESET
  • If reset is not performed, the WXDR 1+2 Fault remains

(END OF EVENT WXR 1 FAULT remains till end of Flt, WXR 2 FAULT remains if no reset)

FCOM-PRO-SUPP-Computer Reset-34 Surv-

Aircraft Environmental Surveillance Unit (AESU) Reset

Reset both, leave them pulled unti the SURV SYS 1 + 2 FAULT alert triggers, then push them back in.

126

Q

TAKE-OFF – CABIN CREW REPORT – ICE ON WING AFTER DE-ICING

  • Just before ATC take-off clearance. Purser: “a passenger, who is a pilot,
    reported some ice on the wing”. Followed by a clearance to line-up by
    ATC

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) HOT before take-off
  • (C) Communication with cabin crew
  • (P)/(K) OM-A

  • Refer to OM-A Cabin Crew Responsibilities
  • HOT considerations
  • Allow 2 mins for the flight crew to conduct a PCI. Inform them that the
    passenger thought the De-icing fluid was ice
    END OF EVENT Event remains until after a PCI has been performed

Check the HOT.

ANC-Request time to perform PCI from ATC.

OM-A 8.2.4.4.1 Cabin Crew responsibilities

Commander bears ultimate responsibility. Cabin crew often are in a better position to observe the condition of the wing upper surface.
Cabin Crew are REQUIRED to report to the Commander any concerns they may have regarding snow or other wing contamination. In addition, it is vital that Cabin Crew advise the Commander of any passenger reports of this nature.
In these events, the Commander or a designated Flight Crew member must conduct a Pre-takeoff Contamination Inspection (PCI).
The Go/NoGo decision based on this inspection should be passed on to the cabin crew in such a manner that it reinforces the need that they become involved when required and that they will feel confident if a future situation demands action on their part.

A PCI is needed if the minimum HOT expires and precipitation has occurred, or whenever doubt exists.
A PCI can extend the HOT with Types II, III, and IV ONLY, and if the MIN HOT is 20 mins or longer.

Using the aircraft Representative Surface and Wing from inside is permissible, but be aware that due to the limited view it may not be possible to complete the PCI effectively. If the latter is the case, a return for removal is mandatory.

127

Q

TAKE-OFF – CHANGE OF SNOW CONDITIONS (WHEN ENTERING DE-ICING
BAY)

  • Only use this event if using a specific Type IV fluid
  • Just before entering de-icing bay: ATC: “Emirates xxx for your info, latest
    visibility is now xxx m, RVR xxx m”
  • De-icing crew offers 75% for fluid mix, however crew can request 100% for
    longer hold-over time

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) Snow intensity versus visibility and change in hold over time
  • (S) Awareness for the change of environment

Consider change to the HOT, and ask de-icing provider if they have 100% mix available to extend the HOT.

Although take-off is permitted under moderate snow conditions, the table on de-icing worksheet/RAIG appendix K should be checked.

Remember, if visibility changes but there is obscuration phenomena, then the Snow Intensity Vs Visibility does not apply. Also, it is to be used with Visibility, and NOT RVR. Confirm with ATC what the snowfall intensity reported is.

128

Q

TAKE-OFF – INOP SEAT BELT FOR J CLASS PASSENGER BEFORE
TAKE-OFF

  • Just before “CABIN READY” and after De-icing completed. CSV: “A seat
    belt for a business class passenger is not working and we are full in
    business class”
  • First class has empty seats. Economy class is full

(DoD 1)

A

  • (M) HOT before take-off
  • (C) Communication with Cabin Crew
  • (P) MEL and OM-A

  • MEL/MEL Items/Preamble/FAILURES PRIOR TO TAKEOFF
  • OM-A, Class of Travel – Passenger Upgrading
  • HOT consideration if de-iced

Under the MEL dispatch is permitted, but if needed, contact MCC to let them know of what is happening as well as course of action.

According to OM-A 20.12.2:

The responsability of upgrading or downgrading a passenger’s class of travel is delegated to the Purser by the Commander.

Commander may also authorize upgrades for OPS reasons. Upgrade has to be submitted by Captain’s Special Report. Should be used sparingly and to minimize service failure on part of EK. Coordination with Purser and Airport Services is REQUIRED where practical and TIME PERMITS (HOT).
Upgrade only made to bonafide revenue PAX and NOT to EK or OAL staff passengers.

129

Q

TAKE-OFF – LAVATORY CONTINUES FLUSHING (USE OF CCOM)

CSV calls anytime above 5000 ft: “One of the
toilets in business class keeps on flushing. The steady blue light remains
ON and I’m worried that it will overheat the flushing motor”

(DoD 1)

A

  • (K) Use of CCOM
  • (L) Crew coordination and teamwork required
  • (C) Communication with the cabin crew

  • For info A380 toilets do not have a flushing motor; system is vacuum based
  • Crews should consult: CCOM > CABIN LAYOUT > LAVATORIES >
    FUNCTION RECOVERY PROC > Deactivation of lavatory functions >
    DEACTIVATE OF LAVATORY (NOISE)
  • Most cabin crew are not aware about this procedure; CCOM is part of the
    OPS LIBRARY and is rarely used by the flight deck crew

(Event remains till CCOM procedure has been applied)

130

Q

TAKE-OFF – LOADSHEET LMC EXCEEDING MAX STRUCTURAL WEIGHT

  • Only use this event if MZFW, MTOW or MLW will be exceeded
  • Crew are pressurised to accept urgent cargo (777 Windshield) +400 KG
  • The dispatcher completes the LMC box on the loadsheet, without correcting
    the actual ZFW, TOW and LW

(DoD 1)

A

  • (S) Awareness of aircraft weights
  • (P) Correct application of LMC in accordance with OM-A

  • Crew are pressurised to accept urgent cargo (777 Windshield) +400 KG
  • The dispatcher completes the LMC box on the loadsheet, without correcting
    the actual ZFW, TOW and LW
  • For LMC guidance refer to OM-A 8.1.8.5.2

The issue here is the ZFW, not the TOW. LMC limits are 500kg.

You can offload 400 and load 500.
You CANNOT offload 400 and load 600.

After LMC, always check maximum weights limits.

If beyond 500kg, new loadsheet.

131

Q

TAKE-OFF – PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR (AT LOW SPEED)

Activate at 40 kts during the takeoff roll

  • Not to be used in Cold weather ops/LVO
  • For the Event to work as planned the brake temperatures must be below
    150°C prior T/O, otherwise it is likely that after the low speed RTO the
    brakes will be too hot to permit a subsequent takeoff
  • If doing a full co*ckpit preparation, set Brake Temps to 300°C on IOS before
    crew enter simulator
  • When Brake cooling is requested, gradually lower the brake temps to
    ambient
  • “WINDSHEAR AHEAD” warning will trigger as this is inhibited only above
    100 kts. FCOM and FCTM procedures require that the CAPT should reject
    the takeoff. Normal RTO standard calls and actions are to be conducted by
    the crew

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Correct RTO Procedures
  • (S) Situational Awareness of brakes condition and WX
  • (C) Communication

  • If the crew reject the takeoff at a higher speed than 50 kts, Brake
    temperatures may reach 300 degrees by the time the next takeoff is
    attempted
  • RTO A/BRK mode is active only above 72 kts, and hence will not activate
    and CAPT will need to conduct a manual reject

(Event ends when next takeoff occurs)

Before Take-off:

Take-off-Delay
Most suitable runway -Select

During take-off roll

Take-off-Reject

When airborne at initial climb

THR Levers -TOGA
AP (if engaged)-Keep on
SRS orders -Follow

RTO
-“STOP”
-TL idle, select Max reverse.

—Below 72knots, no groundspoiler deployment or autobrake activation.—
—If runway available, consider reverse idle, not full braking.—

Parking brake ON
“This it the Captain, attention crew at stations”

PM monitors reverse green, decel, calls out if not present.

Analyze what happened, and proceed with ECAM actions, ABN PROC, QRH as required.

PM does checklists, PF gathers information.

If EVAC required, PF/PM come back together and Captain makes decision.

If EVAC NOT REQUIRED, check doors page, wheel page, outside cameras, and if safe to taxi “This is the Captain, Cabin Crew revert to normal operations” and request taxi. Vacating the runway, disarm speedbrakes and after landing checklist. Consider if another take-off is possible (wheel brakes, reason for RTO) or if heading back to the gate/parking. Either way, PA to passengers to reassure them and pass timely information/specials. If a take-off runway change is desired, you may have to change runways in FMS and it can be tricky to do so since the FMS considers we already initiated the take-off phase. Engine shutdown may be required.

132

Q

TAKE-OFF – PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR (AT ROTATION)

  • Not to be used in Cold weather ops/LVO
  • Event should not be used with another Windshear event

(DoD 1)

A

  • (P) Correct application of PWS memory items
  • (L) Support by PM during windshear avoidance

  • PWS alerts are inhibited on take-off from 100 kts till airborne at 50 ft
  • PWS alerts will disappear at 1500 ft RA, however windshear is still active
    when flying through the area
  • A PIREP should be given once clear of windshear

Before Take-off:

Take-off-Delay
Most suitable runway -Select

During take-off roll

Take-off-Reject

When airborne at initial climb

THR Levers -TOGA
AP (if engaged)-Keep on
SRS orders -Follow

Consider heading away from PWS area in ND, if terrain permits, advice ATC when time allows.

133

Q

TAKE-OFF – REFUEL DELAY DUE TO LIGHTNING

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) Awareness of curfew/time restriction versus time required to complete
    refuelling and departure process
  • (D) Replanning options to allow departure – negotiation on extensions/new
    destination etc.
  • (M) Flexible changes required to departure process under growing time
    pressure

  • Suitable for an airport with a curfew or time pressure to get airborne (VIP
    movement/airspace/airport closure due to airshow etc.)
  • Particularly suitable for ULR LOS/LOE or flight with a large fuel uplift
  • Refuelling is unable to begin due to lightning in the vicinity of the airport
  • When refuelling commences it will be unable to be completed in time to
    allow departure to destination (due to curfew/time restriction)

If utilizing both couplings, it takes approaximately 45 minutes to uplift 261000 litres of fuel (that’s around 200 tons).

Although this seems like a simple failure, it will require communication with VPNC/Dispatch/ATC/Ground staff/Cabin Crew/Passengers.

Fuel stop likely will be required, new flight plan, new loadsheet, new TOPA, etc.

134

Q

TAKE-OFF – RUNWAY CHANGE JUST BEFORE TAXI

  • When crew request taxi, advise crew about the runway change due to ……..
    and request them to start taxi due to traffic behind
  • If used in Cold Weather Ops, state the new runway has been cleared 45 m.
    Consderations for less than 58 m runway shoulder procedure

(DoD 2)

A

  • (P) Runway change, TOPA
  • (S) Snow banks

  • OM-A 8.3.0.3.3 for Runway change guidance
  • TOPA recalculation shall only be done with the aircraft stopped
  • Observe X-check with AVNCS is done

There is a change of runway as well as change of contaminant. A new TOPA calculation, as well as changing the FMS will be required. Request to maintain position or taxi somewhere where preparations can be completed, keeping in mind the HOT. If aircraft is not de-iced yet, may be done at de-icing bay or just before, that way the HOT is not being used up.

According to OM-A 8.3.0.3.3
In case of runway change:
1. TOPA
2. If not performance limited, use original flap setting
3. Make necessary FMS/FCU changes and ensure correct Flap and Stab trim setting.
4. Brief changes to departure, NAP, or EOP.
5. New take-off review as well as action Before Take-off checklist from the beginning.

For the TOPA, according to FCOM/PERF/TAKEOFF/RUNWAY CONTAMINATION/RUNWAY CAT+PERF Basis
depth=<3mm of dry snow is equivalent to WET.

Review FCOM/PRO/SUPPL/APT OPS/OPS RWY less 58m

Outers will be above non-stabilized, therefore:

-Apply 25% on all 4 engines with brakes ON, but can be performed as rolling take-off as well.

-If less than 23knots xwind and no twind:
-Brakes release
-Inners FLX/TOGA
-If Xwind>23 or Twind:
-Thr Inners to 50%
@20kts
-Thr Inners FLX/TOGA
@40kts
-Outers FLX/TOGA

Check THR of each engine is correct by 80kts!

135

Q

TAKE-OFF – TAILWIND AFTER V1

  • Not to be used in Cold weather ops/LVO/with other W/S events
  • Not to be used for take-off on a runway with TOPA stop margin less than
    100 m
  • Use only “Light” to activate W/S
  • Reactive wind-shear above will create a reduced acceleration vector after
    V1 but will likely not activate a RED W/S warning

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Startle effect, quick decision making skills
  • (S) Wind indication on ND and Acceleration vector on PFD

  • Crews should consider TOGA once take-off roll becomes excessive
  • After the flight is airborne, winds remains as scripted and no more W/S
    reports by other A/C. De-active Windshear on IOS by deselecting “Light”

If after V1 there are significant variations in airspeed, then:

Callout - “Windshear TOGA” don’t change config
THR Levers - TOGA
Reaching VR - Rotate normally
SRS orders - Follow

DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION UNTIL OUT OF WINDSHEAR, MONITOR FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED, RECOVER SMOOTHLY TO CLIMB ONCE OUT OF WINDSHEAR.

136

Q

TAKE-OFF – VORTEX ENCOUNTER AFTER TAKE-OFF

Aircraft Upset
Manually enter Pitch 7° NU/Roll 33°R
Manually press Activate at 500 ft RA
Note: Activate is greyed out on the ground

(DoD 1)

A

  • (D) Startle effect
  • (C) Communication with ATC, Cabin Crew and PAX after the event
  • (H) No sustained over controlling if manual flight
  • (A) Use of A/P if it remains engaged

  • Role play aircraft taking-off ahead, use Ground Traffic for increased realism
  • Sim testing shows that in most cases, AP remains engaged throughout the
    event
  • No cabin/passenger injuries when enquired

137

Q

VOLCANIC ASH – PRE-DEPARTURE

VOLCANIC ASH BLOWING DUST

(DoD 2)

A

  • (P) Procedural execution of FCOM, Aircraft preparation for departure in volcanic ash.
  • (C) Coordination with Ground support for external Air, GPU. Communication with
    Crew/Pax re air-conditioning discomfort.
  • (WLM) Coordination of supplementary start procedure as well as air conditioning/
    bleed management.
  • (D) Effective implementation of procedures and solutions to ensure a satisfactory
    outcome.

  • Volcanic ash has very abrasive particles that can significantly damage aircraft parts
    and can degrade the operation of aircraft systems.
  • Operators should avoid airports covered with volcanic ash, however if it is
    unavoidable then FCOM Supplementary Procedures must be applied to minimise
    damage to aircraft departing from these airports.
  • Use of external GPU and Air-conditioning as well as Pack/Bleed management
    requires coordination until clear of ash cloud and normal systems can be reestablished.

(Event ends after clear of volcanic ash cloud on departure).

Use the Volcanic ash/Sand/Dust checklist in FCOM-PRO-SUP-Adverse Weather-Operations in Volcanic ash, sand, or dust.

APU-do not use
Windshield wipers-do not use
coolg-as required
Pack1+2-off but not longer than 30 minutes without AC

For take-off
Braking Perf degraded

Walkaround
Check for deposits and all inlets free

Engine start
Crank (use engine cranking procedure in FCOM-PRO-SUP-Engine-Unusual engine starting Pro-Cranking

For Taxi
After brake release, Engine bleeds off
smooth use of thrust levers and prefer low or idle thrust settings if possible.
If performing 180, perform 180 into wind in case of xwind.

Take-off
Consider rolling take-off and make sure ash is settle if another aircraft departed before us.
OEB19 doesn’t allow us to take-off with packs OFF, but in this case we are taking off with BLEEDS OFF, nevertheless, contact MCC and ask them if take-off is permitted with bleeds off with the OEB, and if they say it is not permitted, then advise them of possible pack and bleed contamination due to the volcanic ash. It should technically be ok with bleeds off

Try to minimize all time spent in volcanic ash, if possible, coordinate with ATC unrestricted climb to avoid continuous operation in ASH. Once clear of the ash cloud, Bleeds back on one at a time, and normalize cooling/packs.

138

Q

WHEEL – BODY L/G TIRE BURST

TIRE PRESS LO (BLG 13-14)

On landing preselect criteria at SPEED 115 KIAS.

On takeoff preselect criteria V1-10 kts

  • Motion, sound, braking and ground handling effects take place – the left
    wing visually drops less than 1° and the landing distance will be increased

(DoD 2)

A

  • (S) Awareness of active runway environment, limited visibility, following
    traffic etc.
  • (P) Taxiing with deflated tires
  • (C) ATC, Purser, Pax, Engineering are being all kept informed

  • Crew assessment of the aircrafts ability to vacate the runway and/or taxi
  • Don’t stop the event too soon. Allow the situation to play out to see
    appropriate management and communication with all parties
  • For batch 6 aircraft refer to ABN not sensed procedure TIRE DAMAGE
    SUSPECTED

FCOM/LIM/32/Wheel/Taxi with deflated tires

Max taxi = 3kt
Max steering 30 degrees

Max 9 deflated tires

1 per NLG

2 per BLG but cannot be same axle, unless it’s the center axle (can be any other same axle for rwy vacating ONLY)

2 per WLG but cannot be same axle (can be same axle for rwy vacating ONLY)

DO NOT TAXI! Advise engineering of possible tire burst, aircraft will have to be inspected for further damage. Let Purser, PAX, and ATC know of intentions. If tire burst is confirmed, taxiing is not allowed until an inspection is completed. If burst did not occur, and only deflation, then consider slow taxi.

According to FCTM, burst does not allow taxiing or tow if the ground crew assesses that a tire spread can damage the landing gear. If that is the case, the affected wheels must be CHANGED before taxi.

Don’t rush, the runway will have to be inspected anyway, therefore rushing will not help mitigate subsequent go-around of following traffic.

139

Q

WHEEL – NOSE L/G TIRE BURST (AFTER V1)

TIRE PRESS LO (BURST 90 KT)
NOSE
ARM BEFORE Take-off, preselect criteria IAS V1+2 KTS

(DoD 2)

A

  • (D) Possible diversion due to likely runway blockage
  • (C) Coordination with ATC, VPNC

  • Failure is called Burst 90 kts on IOS, however a higher speed can be set
  • Both nose gear tires are blown with vibration when still on the ground
  • Tires pressures are 0 psi if speed is >90 kts
  • Refer to FCOM TAXI WITH DEFLATED TIRES after landing
  • For batch 6 aircraft refer to ABN not sensed procedure TIRE DAMAGE
    SUSPECTED

FCOM/PRO/SUPPLEMENTARY PROC/AIRPORT OPS/Taxi with deflated tires

Max taxi = 3kt
Max steering 30 degrees

Max 9 deflated tires

1 per NLG

2 per BLG but cannot be same axle, unless it’s the center axle (can be any other same axle for rwy vacating ONLY)

2 per WLG but cannot be same axle (can be same axle for rwy vacating ONLY)

Advise tower so they look for debris, check for leaks from possible damage.

DO NOT TAXI! Advise engineering of tire burst, aircraft will have to be inspected for further damage. Let Purser, PAX, and ATC know of intentions and to expect to be towed to the gate.

In this case, since both NLG tires burst, taxiing is not possible. If uncertain about state of tires, request ground crew to check condition before taxi, also use ETACS.

Consider not retracting the gear right away in case of major damage, on that note, think about your performance, consider TOGA.

zz - Scenarios Flashcards by Fred Francis (2024)
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